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The present study discusses the Swedish policy development assistance to the Baltic states from 
the 1990s to 2004. The research examines the case of aid-giving policy in the context of the post-
Cold War transition of the Baltic states supplemented by the prospective of their integration into 
the EU. The importance of the research topic is supported by that the issue of foreign aid-giving 
policy remains open for the analysis and discussion. Such openness allows for the concrete 
examination of the development assistance practice.  
An attempt to put this practice in selected temporal and spatial context of the Nordic–Baltic 
post-Cold War development is central to the present research. From three Baltic states Latvia 
has been chosen as an example of the recipient country. With the provision of the example, it is 
hoped that this research will contribute to the deeper understanding of Sweden as a donor 
reflecting on the changes occurred in the immediate neighbourhood. The main hypothesis is that 
Sweden’s aid-giving policy was acting as a tool of Swedish post-Cold War Europeanization 
through the support of Latvia as one of the Baltic states in transition. 
The issue of interests or motives for aid-giving policy is crucial. The range of interests has 
been revealed as a result from the descriptions on state actor behaviour proposed by the IR 
theories. In this research, the interests are framed in categories for the content analysis of 
documents on Swedish development cooperation with CEE countries in which three Baltic ones 
have been included. The account of the EU enlargement is given here as an applying meaning 
of Europeanization. The term of ‘Europeanization’ is used in this thesis to define the projection of 
the prospective of the EU enlargement on Swedish development cooperation with Baltic states 
and Latvia in particular. The presence of the EU to the state of the external factor has been 
deliberately limited to show up its indirect impact. 
   The main findings have confirmed the previous knowledge on that Sweden demonstrated its 
willingness to support the transition of the Baltic states with their integration into the EU. At the 
same time, the established analysis offers some new insights in the understanding of the way in 
which Sweden has been constructing its interests, power, obligations and commitment to the 
processes taking place in their close vicinity of the post-Cold War Europe.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
The present Master’s Thesis studies the Swedish foreign policy of development 
assistance to the Baltic states in their post-Cold War transition. Particularly, the 
case of Sweden’s development assistance to Latvia from 1990 to 2004 is 
examined. Through the literature review, theoretical framework and selected 
methodology, this work establishes a broad discussion of such major changes of 
post-Cold War environment as the USSR dissolution in 1991, the transition 
process of the new independent Baltic states and the first wave of the EU 
enlargement. It is important to note that the general application of certain 
meanings might not only be attributed to a narrowed research focus but also to a 
wider geographical area. For instance, the conceptual framework of 
Europeanization, as it will be seen below, encompasses the area of former 
socialist Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries – including the Baltic 
ones – which were undergoing the common process of socio-economic and 
political transition on the way to democracy, market economy and EU 
membership (Grabbe, 2003: 304). 
Sweden has been interpreted here as a state actor responding to the changes 
through the increase of activism and demonstration of support to the common 
willingness of the Baltic states to adhere to the EU. The term of ‘development 
assistance’ has been used to refer to the practice of aid-giving policy in which 
development is a purpose (Lancaster, 2007: 2). Latvia, conceptually and 
contextually included in a wider geographical area, has been selected for the 
current research as an example of aid recipient needed in some support to 
remove the barriers on the way to the EU membership.  
Several reasons have been suggested to explain the choice of the country. 
Latvia, similarly to Sweden, was positioned in some of the literature work 
(Ozolina, 1997: 127) on the periphery of European post-Cold War developments, 
from which the EU enlargement was crucial. The risk of leaving out of this process 
was relevant for Latvia in transition if the fact of lagging behind Estonia in a state 
of economy and policy is considered. The presence of this risk was important for 
Sweden positioning itself as playing a leading role in support of the Baltics. The 
interest in promotion of integration of all Baltic states has become central on 
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several levels – domestic debates, Nordic policies (in which commonality and 
rivalry has been revealed), and EU/EC agenda (Ozolina, 1999; Bergman, 2006).  
Such international positioning from the Sweden’s side may be also seen as an 
evidence of foreign policy reorientation towards less cautiousness about (ex-
)Soviet factor and more activism, quite new for a country with a neutrality doctrine 
(cf. Brommesson, 2010; Kuldkepp, 2016). Latvia has had such problems as rights 
provision for Russian minorities, dismantling of the Soviet military equipment, 
demands for in-depth reforms which are required to be taken into account by 
Sweden in the role of a donor state. Regarding this, I briefly discuss the role of 
sub-national actor of Swedish International Development (cooperation) Agency 
(Sida) serving as a channel of national aid-giving policy. 
1.2. Literature review and conceptual framework 
Several attempts have been made in this research to establish what is already 
known about the topic. The first is a review of a literature with provision of a wider 
perspective of post-Cold War development, prior to the Nordic–Baltic relations 
with a narrowing focus on Sweden and Latvia. I used the terms of ‘norm 
entrepreneurs’ or ‘internationalism’ to refer to the features giving a priority to the 
Nordic states in their active self-positioning in international relations (Ingebritsen, 
2002; Bergman, 2006). Such positioning was a rationalisation of the essential 
understanding of the country’s place in the world (Ringmar, 1998: 45) as well as 
the rationalization of the subject of power in global politics in regard to the 
favourable international conditions of lower militarisation for Sweden to increase 
its soft power (Kuldkepp, 2016: 401).  
The latter, according to Kuldkepp (idem, 424–425) has a pivotal role in shift from 
‘cautious’ attitude towards the Baltic states, prior to the (ex-)Soviet factor 
delaying, in some sense, the process of official recognition of the Baltic 
independence. Consequently, the increase of activism has led to the lobbyism of 
the integration of all three republic into the EU. On the one hand, for Nordic that 
was the common expression of support (Bergman, 2006; Czarny, 2018). On the 
other hand, there were international and domestically prescribed debates on 
whether to integrate all three states or only Estonia as one that is more 
appropriate from the state of economy and policy (Lejins, 1999; Ozolina, 1999).  
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On the question of the choice of two countries, I refer to Bennich-Björkman 
(2002a; 2002b) who shows that Latvia politically and economically has been 
lagging behind Estonia, which additionally gives some priority to the country in 
the role of recipient of Swedish provision of assistance. I also follow Stavridis 
(2003: 10-11) who gave the profile of reasoning for Greece to establish the case 
of his study. According to what I have, Latvia has been a country located in the 
dynamic Baltic region, closer to the former USSR. With a risk of being on the 
periphery of the post-Cold War development (Ozolina, 1997: 127) it needed 
modernization to meet the Copenhagen Criteria (cf. Bennich-Bjorkman, 2002a: 
367). 
The subject of interest has been discussed in this work as a background and 
theoretical point of reference. In a literature review I have provided three 
categories of vital, essential and general interests to describe the objective of 
Latvian and Swedish foreign policies (Pabriks and Purs, 2001; Ozolina, 1999). 
The theoretical framework establishes the discussion on this question through 
the review of IR scholars – realism and liberalism traditions, neo-Marxism, 
constructivism – given as the providers of frames of aid-giving motives in 
country’s foreign policy. The focus has become limited to the rationalist and 
constructivist foundations uniting the discussion of foreign aid and 
Europeanization.  
The concept of Europeanization has been provided in this research with an 
applying meaning to establish the discussion of the EU enlargement. Given as 
an area of common process, the CEE countries were the referent actors in 
general (Grabbe, 2003). Through the rationalist and constructivist foundations, 
the enlargement resulting in the effects of Europeanization has returned to the 
discussion of self-interest and ideational factors, mentioned earlier in regard to 
the foreign aid (e.g. Lancaster, 2007; Veen, 2011). To develop the further 
analysis of the narrowed research focus, I will use the term of ‘Europeanization’ 
in this thesis to define the projection of the prospective of the EU enlargement on 
Swedish development cooperation with Baltic states and Latvia in particular.    
1.3. Research gap and research questions 
While foreign aid is established as a common foreign policy practice, the existing 
body of literature recognizes that the question about the interests pursuing by the 
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aid-giving actor remains open for the examination (Lancaster, 2007; Veen, 2011). 
As the literature provides with some broad theoretical frameworks to discuss the 
motives of the state’s foreign aid (ibid.), they can be optionally applied to the 
development of the current research. Several previous studies have established 
that solidarity of Sweden with a recipient’s own vision on development  have 
always been the main motive of Swedish development assistance (Schraeder, 
et.al., 1998; Danielson and Wohlgemuth, 2005). In other words, there is an 
ideological component in Swedish relations with the recipient. The research gap 
here is that the topic of Swedish foreign development aid policy is well-
established mainly through the empirical study of Swedish relations with African 
countries (Danielson and Wohlgemuth, 2005; Dijkstra and White, 2002). This 
means that the case of Baltic states as recipients of Swedish aid has yet to be 
thoroughly studied, although the historical chapter on foreign aid in Lancaster’s 
book recognizes the support of political and economic changes in post-
communist countries as one of the new purposes of foreign aid appeared in 
1990s (Lancaster, 2007: 44–46).  
The central question in the research is how Swedish state-led policy of 
development assistance has been reflecting on the post-Cold War changes in the 
immediate Baltic neighbourhood. The thesis is aimed at examining the Sweden’s 
foreign policy of development assistance towards Latvia with the help of the 
concept of Europeanization. The following research questions are combined with 
the aim of the research: 
• What was the nature of the relationship between Sweden and Latvia in the 
context of post-Cold War development? 
• What have been the objectives of Sweden’s development assistance and how 
they are related to the EU enlargement? When reorientation is seen as 
Europeanization? 
1.4. Data and methods 
Data for this study were collected using the official websites of Sida, Government 
Offices of Sweden (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and Riksdag(-en) or Swedish 
parliament. I utilised open documents (e.g. reports of inquiry – SOU, proposals, 
country strategy on development cooperation with Latvia, report of analysis on 
Latvia from Sida) and secondary materials (e.g. Sida’s reports, foreign policy 
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thematic yearbook and brochures). Regarding the method, I selected a deductive 
way of doing qualitative content analysis, as it proposes a specific attention on 
the textual material while reduces the risk of overdetermination of some aspects 
(Julien, 2008; Schreier, 2014) and, in addition, allows for addressing the previous 
knowledge in testing (Elo and Kyngäs, 2008). Three research works 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Lancaster, 2007; Veen, 2011) have 
been used to build the categories for analysis. 
1.5. Thesis structure and key terms 
The Master’s Thesis will be organised in the following way. It begins by the 
presented introduction and then go on to review the literature, give the 
background information on the topic and explain the choice of two countries for 
the research. Chapter three begins by laying out the theoretical dimensions of the 
research and looks at how the Swedish foreign policy may be prescribed through 
the discussion of foreign aid motives in IR literature or foundations of theorising 
Europeanization. The fourth chapter is concerned with the methodology used for 
this study. Chapter five analyses the results of the documentation study and 
presents the research findings.  The research also contains the conclusion 
chapter and list of references.  
In the next two paragraphs, I focus on three main terms I use. The first is 
‘transition’ associated with the reform process in the Baltic states initiated as a 
result of their willingness to leave out the Soviet legacy and become the EU 
members in the relevant future (сf. Isaksson, 2004; Bergman, 2006; Czarny, 
2018). The second is the term of ‘development assistance’, substituting the term 
of ‘foreign aid’ but rather different, as it contains the self-explanation of a certain 
type of aid purpose (Lancaster, 2007). Additionally, the term of ‘development 
cooperation’ identifies more the respect from Sweden to the recipients’ vision and 
interests indicated in the literature (cf. Bennich – Björkman, 2002b) 
The third is the concept of Europeanization associated in this study with the EU 
enlargement but also differentiated from that as encompasses the effects of the 
enlargement, while the general theory of enlargement may include the subject of 
reasons to be integrated into the EU (Grabbe, 2003). As was proposed above, I 
use this term to refer to the (in-)direct effects of the EU enlargement on Swedish 
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development cooperation with Baltic states, from which I give the more detailed 
examination of Latvia.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW: SWEDEN’S FOREIGN POLICY TO 
LATVIA IN A WIDER PERSPECTIVE 
In the following pages, I will present a literature review to discuss the relationship 
between Sweden and Latvia after the Cold War in a wider perspective. This 
chapter begins by stating the (re-)establishment of Nordic foreign policies in 
regard to the process of transition in the Baltic countries since the 1990s.  
It will be argued that the relationship between Sweden and Latvia has had a dual 
nature deriving from the changes of the post-Cold War international environment 
and being formed by the domestic factors in response. Mainly referring to the 
USSR dissolution in 1991 and the EU enlargement since its beginning from the 
1990s, I also link them with the domestic process of Baltic states transition and 
reorientation of Swedish foreign policy. Mainly focusing on Swedish example, this 
research reviews the provision of the explanatory contexts of changes in the 
country’s policy. One of the key aspects was the account of domestic factors 
responding reflectively to the two major transformations of the international 
environment.  
Regarding the process of reorientation in policies, the question of interests has 
become essential. On the one side, it has been reflecting on the vision of changes 
occurred in the immediate environment. In case of Sweden, it has required 
questioning of the traditional doctrine of neutrality, especially in policy towards 
the Baltic states. On the other one, it has become the domestic question covering 
the crisis of welfare state and ongoing debates on the willingness to support the 
reforms in Baltic states as well as the prospective of their EU membership. 
Consequently, this has become also the issue of Sweden’s international 
positioning in its dynamic relations with Baltic and Nordic neighbours and the EU.  
In the second part of the chapter, l will attempt to explain from the wider 
perspective what determines the choice of two countries, Sweden and Latvia for 
the conduction of this research. Latvia has been chosen as an example of 
Swedish cooperation and assistance with the Baltic states. Following the 
 
 
11 
 
argument on the maintenance of the donor and recipient’s interests framing in the 
immediate vision of internal socio-economic development (cf. Danielson and 
Wohlgemuth, 2005: 518) I will consider two key aspects of the choice. The first is 
that Latvia was behind Estonia consequently risking not to get involved in the first 
wave of EU enlargement. The second is the dynamic of the Swedish reflective 
attitude towards the Latvia’s risk articulated both in domestic debates and inter-
Nordic state-led rivalry on the scale of negotiations with the EU.  
2.1. The explanatory contexts on the question of Sweden’s interest in 
post-Cold War cooperation with Baltic states 
The literature review identifies two key aspects of Sweden’s foreign policy 
reorientation after the end of the Cold War in regard to the initiation of cooperation 
with the post-Soviet Baltic states. It will go on to suggest that the preferable 
international conditions in concordance with the common interest in this from the 
side of Sweden’s Nordic neighbours has led to the setting of the Swedish activism 
towards the Baltics on agenda. In addition, there has been an attempt to show 
the increase of interest as domestically prescribed. The interest itself can be 
defined as a dynamic process initiated specifically by the presence of domestic 
debates and international competition. The first section of the chapter pre-
establishes the topic of the research from a wider perspective. The second 
section moves on to continue the review and explain in greater detail the choice 
of Sweden and Latvia relations addressing as the transformation of the 
international environment in Europe as the development assistance policy from 
the Swedish side.   
2.1.1. The Baltic and Nordic states in the post-Cold War European 
environment 
As far as the present research concerns about the (re-)emergence of the Baltic 
question in Sweden’s post-Cold War policy, I resort to the general discussion of 
the Nordic states’ role in a new international environment. Epistemically, such 
questions as ‘Who are we?’ or ‘What is our role in the world?’ can be defined as 
essential (Ringmar, 1998: 45, italics added). The issue of power in global politics 
referring to the end of the Cold War has received considerable critical attention, 
in which such small states as the five Northern European states of Denmark, 
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Finland, Sweden, Norway and Iceland have been given a priority (Ingebritsen, 
2002: 11–12).  
Adding to the abovementioned issue, Kuldkepp (2016: 401) states that the 
relevant possibility of any military intervention was becoming lower to the end of 
the Cold War. As he concludes out, Sweden found itself in a favourable domestic 
and international conditions encouraging the relative strength of its soft power 
(ibid.). It is also necessary to mention that the international reputation of the 
Nordic states comprises the geographical proximity, respect to the international 
order and institutions, commitment to the promotion of values through the 
internationalist behaviour and domestic reformism (Ingebritsen, 2002: 13; 
Bergman, 2006: 73).  
Generally, the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and the consequences to which it 
led further framed the common condition having a considerable impact on the 
development of a new political system in the end of the Cold War (Agh, 1998:  
24). From the side of the Nordic states, this collapse and the following process of 
transition in Baltic states may be seen as what gave them the opportunity to 
establish the cooperation and dialogue with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania based 
of the willingness to support of political, economic and social development in 
neighbouring countries and, thus, revise the pre-developed practices and 
innovations in domestic and foreign policies (Bergman, 2006: 74).  
Kuldkepp (2016: 398), on the other hand, uses the terms of ‘ambivalence’ and 
‘cautiousness’ to highlight the historical existence of (ex-) Soviet factor, which 
had been playing a determinant role in a relative passivism of Swedish foreign 
policy towards the Baltic states. This may lead to the conclusion that the purpose 
of leaving out the Soviet system pointed by the Swedish journalist and Sida’s 
project-coordinator David Isaksson (2004: 211) has had its importance not only 
for Baltic states (e.g. Pabriks and Purs, 2001: 134) but also for Sweden, as the 
presence of ex-Soviet troops was prescribed in terms of ‘long-destabilizing’ factor 
and ‘expression of age-old Swedish cautiousness’ (Kuldkepp, 2016: 424–425). 
Dating back to the 27th of August 1991, Kuldkepp (2016: 424), conversely to 
Czarny (2018: 269), states that Sweden was not the first country to recognise the 
Baltic independence and (re-)establish diplomatic relations. According to the 
Embassy of the Republic of Latvia in the Kingdom of Sweden (2014), the date of 
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recognition of Latvia’s independence by Sweden was that one mentioned by 
Kuldkepp (ibid.).  
However, on a scale of negotiations with the EU, the Nordic neighbours have 
been evaluated as the ‘energetic’ lobbyists, involvement of which prevented the 
Baltics from being dropped off from the rest of Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) post-socialist countries integrating with the Union (Lejins, 1999: 16). The 
future EU membership has been identified as the top priority as for Baltic states 
as for Nordic ones with their expression of support (e.g. Bergman, 2006; Czarny, 
2018: 269). Czarny (2018: 262) points out that, while the enlargement has 
provided new opportunities for cooperation and agenda-setting, it has been found 
difficult to make decisions satisfied for all members and particularly have a voice 
of small states heard. What can be defined here as ‘opportunity-and-problem’ 
duality in a nature of EU membership has likely intensified the Nordic-Baltic 
cooperation.  
At the same time, it is necessary to give more contrast to the presentation of 
commonality in Nordic foreign policies. Ozolina (1997: 127) and Bergman (2006: 
82) establish the presence of realpolitik in Nordic policies of Baltic transition 
support resulting in rivalry and competition. In the same vein, Lejins (1999: 16–
17) considers the negative attitude of the major European powers (Britain, 
Germany and France) towards the integration of all Baltic states into the EU in 
the first wave of enlargement to show up that Sweden was switching its side 
either to Finland with support of Estonia as the only EU member state in the future 
or to Denmark standing for the integration of all ten Central European applicants 
with inclusion of three Baltic ones.  
By September 1997 the consensus between Finland, Denmark and Sweden on 
the integration of all Baltic states into the EU was collapsed. The strict position of 
Sweden, similar to Denmark, on the integration of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
was strongly criticized by a variety of Finnish press publication for the 
exacerbating of ‘political positioning or image’ (Ozolina, 1999: 96–97). Although 
Denmark and Sweden came together in their support of Baltic states integration 
into the EU, they were competing, for instance, in trade and development – here 
Sweden’s position was stronger (Ozolina, 1999: 98). On the international scale 
Sweden, unlike Denmark, was transmitting its vision of EU as a top priority in 
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cooperation with the Baltics on the strengthening of the regional security (Ozolina, 
1997: 130). Throughout the discussion of the security patterns and changes on 
the European level, the real challenge of being in a ‘gray zone’ occurring from 
some lack of adaptation to the mainstream post-Cold War developments in 
Europe has been faced by Sweden and Latvia encouraging their cooperation 
(Lejins, 1999: 16; Ozolina, 1997: 127).  
In regard to the comparison of Sweden and Denmark on the vision of the EU 
enlargement, Ozolina (1999: 102) raises the question of Sweden’s potential 
NATO membership as a matter of domestic political debate and less popularity 
on the level of officials.  The account of it explains why the country has limited its 
support to the Baltics with a more respect to the EU (cf. Ozolina: 1997: 130). At 
the same time, whereas Sweden had a strict position on the integration of all 
Baltic states into the EU in negotiations with the European Commission in 1997–
1999, that was also a part of parliamentary debates inside the country. In these 
debates, as Ozolina (1999: 103) writes, Moderates Party and former Swedish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Lena Hjelm–Wallen rejected this proposition from Carl 
Bildt to integrate all three Baltic countries into the EU. As the author concludes, 
the evidence of the debates illustrates a lack of unanimous opinion on the Baltic’s 
EU membership within the national political forces (ibid.). 
2.1.2. Stating the interests and risks in Swedish and Latvian policies in the 
end of the Cold War 
Before proceeding to examine the risks, it is important to address the issue of 
interests in the discussion of Swedish and Latvian policies. The following 
presentation of interests in this paragraph has been established in several studies 
(e.g. Pabriks and Purs, 2001: 125–126, Ozolina, 1999: 93–94) with reference to 
RAND researcher James Tomson. Ozolina (1999: 93) explains the role of Baltic 
states in foreign and security policy of Nordic states with the focus on EU 
membership. She follows the Swedish security expert Ingemar Dorfer, who has 
also used this classification. The interests have been divided into three categories 
– vital, essential and general. They serve as the explanation of immediate 
Swedish and Latvian objectives of foreign policy, prior to the end of the Cold War 
and the major transformation of international or even supranational relations in 
Europe.  
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Vital interests are defined as the interests in defence and independence from 
either the country or its neighbours. In relation to Latvia as one of the Baltic 
countries, integration into the EU is what assists the country to reach its vital 
interests in sovereignty and security (Pabriks and Purs, 2001: 125). The term of 
essential interests is associated with the influence of international developments 
on the country’s domestic policy and international position. Ozolina (1999: 94) 
identifies the cooperation with the Baltic states and the support of their efforts to 
join the EU as part of the Nordic essential interests.  The energetic support of the 
Nordic countries in the EU membership with a real prospective of domestic 
changes and international positioning was a part of Baltic’s essential interests. 
Finally, general interests are defined in accordance with the actions of the state 
in the provision of security, stability, peace, etc. on regional or global scale. 
Consequently, the general interests were common for Baltic and Nordic states 
altogether, as they were used in terms of participation in the different aspects of 
European transformation from the position of small states (Pabriks and Purs, 
2001: 126; Ozolina, 1997: 113). 
Describing in a greater detail some determinants of the Swedish risk in a given 
temporal context, I refer to the argument of Kuldkepp (2016: 400), who notes that 
the ‘geopolitical context’ is not only one to explain sufficiently the reorientation of 
Swedish foreign policy towards activism in Baltic matters. He proposes ‘a more 
nuanced’ view on domestic factors, prescribing geopolitics as a subject to 
changing interpretations, despite they seem to be given or eternal at a first 
glance. Here I can also refer to Bergman (2006: 76) with her argument about the 
long-standing existence of ‘close connection’ between the provision of ‘universal 
welfare’ at the domestic level and internationalist behaviour in foreign policy 
practice of development assistance. In the post-Cold War reality this connection 
has been transformed. On the one side, the change of Swedish politics comes 
from the relative state crisis, in which the dilemma of saving the Social 
Democratic provision of economic wealth and neoliberal U-turn appeared 
(Kuldkepp, 2016: 418; Ringmar, 1998: 45). For instance, contrasting with the 
fears of welfare state crisis in Sweden, those who were supporting the Sweden’s 
EU integration had a positive attitude towards the belonging to the EU common 
market (Ringman, 1998: 52).  
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Turning now to the Swedish foreign policy reorientation, it is important to consider 
that the traditionally existing neutrality has been domestically moving on to its 
post-status. The neutrality has been identified by the Prime Minister Carl Bildt as 
less adequate in new reality specifically revealed in his interest in Baltic matters 
(Ringmar, 1998: 45; Brommesson, 2010: 235; Kuldkepp, 2016: 419).  On his 
criticism to the Sweden’s neutrality Bildt addressed the issue of historical guilty 
associated with the extradition of people as well as transfer of resources from the 
Baltics to the Soviet Union (Czarny, 2018: 269).  As a conclusion, Agius (211: 
379) points out that Sweden ‘would have the option to be neutral in the event of 
a war in its vicinity’, for instance in the event of a possible military threat to the 
Baltic states. The same shift has taken place in relation to the interpretation of 
norms. Whether Sweden’s promotion of norms has been regarded as a domestic 
product of welfare innovation projected on the international level, the more 
welcoming attitude towards the EU has interpreted the same through the sense 
of commitment to the EU or wider ‘Europe’ (see: Bergman, 2006; Brommesson, 
2010).  
Before summarising this section, it is necessary to give a small note on 
chronology and research gap. Isaksson (2004: 211–212) divides the Swedish 
cooperation with the Baltic states into three phases identifying a driving force for 
each of them. Czarny (2018: 270) also uses this division in his work. According 
to them, the first period from 1990 to 1992/1993 covers the reform process on 
market economies with leaving the Soviet system behind. The second period 
from 1992/1993 to 1995 was the time of institutional building and increasing work 
on environmental and social issues. The final period from 1995/1996 to early 
2004 involved cooperation into the problems of adaptation and continuation of 
reforms to facilitate the EU membership for the Baltic countries.  
It is necessary to point out here the limited time frame for cooperation of Sweden 
with the Baltic states in transition. In the Introduction the research gap regarding 
the well-established topic of Sweden’s aid policy to Africa has been stated earlier. 
Isaksson (2004: 217; 228) gives two reasons to differ the aid promotion to the 
Baltic states from the same policy to Africa. The first was an intention to have this 
dimension of Swedish aid separated from each other and avoid any possible, 
particularly ethic, restrictions. The second was that the geographical proximity as 
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well as the EU enlargement created a favourable top-down pressure within the 
sides of cooperation. 
2.2. Note on the example of Sweden’s aid to Latvia 
2.2.1. The explanation of choice 
Considering the personal interest in promotion of the validity of the research topic, 
let us turn now to the following section of the literature review. This is a starting 
point of the attempt to explain the choice of two countries, Sweden and Latvia, 
for the further discussion of development assistance policy in theoretical and 
analytical chapters.  
To begin with, I refer to Stavridis (2003: 10–11) who provided a list of the reasons 
to explain why Greece is the case of his study. I adopt the proposed logic of 
reasoning  for the argumentation of the choice of Latvia below: 
- The presence of (ex-)Soviet Russia as a matter of cautiousness, 
previously mentioned with reference to Kuldkepp (ibid). 
- A country with the risk of becoming peripheral as lagging behind Estonia 
(cf. Lejins, 1999: 16). 
- Democracy, security, and economic problems and the importance of 
modernisation.  
- A country located in a dynamic region, the dynamism of which has been 
supported by the Nordic countries (Ozolina, 1997: 113–114). 
Some of the reasons have been partly explained on the previous pages. Here I 
make the additional notes. 
The peripheral position has been previously explained as the risk for Latvia to 
remain outside the EU/EC agenda in the first wave of the enlargement. After the 
USSR dissolution, the problems in domestic reforms and EU membership 
accounting their interdependence became critical to Latvia. The lack of strong 
domestic institutions, national economy and guarantees for the provision of 
human rights for Russian-speaking minorities and recognition of their civil status 
were the main domestic factor negatively contributing to the international 
recognition (Pabriks and Purs, 2001: 122; Bennich–Björkman, 2002a: 367). 
Returning briefly to the subject of interests in this sentence, the Copenhagen 
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Criteria requirements for the candidate countries to develop market economies, 
respect the rule of law and be functioning democracies played an essential role 
in addressing the issue of preparedness to join the EU in general (Agh, 1999: 44; 
Bennich–Björkman, 2002a: 367). 
Giving some details, I refer to the comparison of Estonia and Latvia established 
in the work of Bennich–Björkman (2002b: 345–360). Analysing the state of their 
post-Cold War development he concluded out that Estonia, both politically and 
economically, was leading over Latvia. The author uses the term of ‘state capture’ 
(2002b: 345) defined as ‘the predominantly illegal impact of powerful economic 
interests on the formation of laws, regulations and decrees<…>’. According to 
the author (2002b: 346), it encompasses a set of such illegal practices of ‘sale to 
the private interests’ as sale of votes in the parliament or illegal sponsorship to 
the political parties, sale of court decisions, etc. In addition, Bennich–Björkman 
makes an important note on the distinction of ‘state capture’ from what he calls 
‘formalised corporatist arrangements’ by highlighting the illegal manner of the 
provision of interests in the first term he uses.  
Through the given figure, he shows that the Latvia’s state capture index was 
approximately 30, while Estonia’s one was approximately 10 (ibid.). Further, 
addressing the demographic issue, the researcher shows up the relevant 
importance of this for Latvia in comparison with Estonia - 61.5% Estonians and 
30% Russians, 52% of Latvians and 34% of Russians (Bennich–Björkman, 
2002b: 350). It may be seen as that the demand for respect of the Russian 
minorities might be relatively more visible in case of Latvia and require a little bit 
more international attention, in particular, from the EU and Nordic neighbours.  
On the question of Swedish policy to Latvia, some features associated with the 
importance of adjusting to the EU should be highlighted. As discussed above, the 
issue of integration of all Baltic states into the EU had the international 
significance, was the topic of state-led competition and domestic debates. At the 
same time, following the previous reference to Isaksson (2004: 217), the inclusion 
of all three Baltic republics was a matter of ethics demanding for the consideration 
of attention to all dimension of development cooperation, while attributing to them 
separately. Regarding this, Ozolina (1999: 103–104) describes the Sweden’s 
official position as based on the following argument: ‘if the Baltic states are split 
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up and some countries are raised above others, this will not promote the pace of 
reform and will cause some countries to fall behind’. She continues the discussion 
by noting that the raise of some integrating states above others was strongly 
unfavourable, as it may cause the negative attitude towards the EU.  
In addition to the previous point, Latvia missing out of ‘a similar early invitation 
into EU accession negotiations to the one that Estonia received in 1997’ has been 
declared by the Latvian Prime Minister as a deliberate breaking-up of a Baltic 
unity, in regard to which Estonia, referring to the Estonian Prime Minister, 
‘distance itself from the other two Baltic states in favour of a Nordic orientation’ 
(Aalto, 2006: 81). Conclusively, according to the Prime Minister, it ‘dissociates 
the country from Estonia also in the context of EU enlargement’ (ibid.).  
To continue the reasoning of the specific-oriented study of two countries, I turn to 
the subject of the features characterizing Sweden as a donor in relation to Latvia. 
2.2.2. The relevant features of Swedish aid-giving policy to Latvia 
Before providing a theoretical discussion of foreign aid in the next chapter, it is 
necessary to give a brief review of the relevant features of Swedish aid-giving 
policy. According to Danielson and Wohlgemuth (2005: 518), what has 
characterised Sweden as a ‘soft’ donor is the primary account of the recipient’s 
interests and design of the aid-giving policy in concordance with that. 
Furthermore, as the researchers (2005: 519) claim, foreign aid was neither the 
matter of interference in the recipient’s own development vision nor the export of 
the Swedish model.  
As it has been stated further by the authors, however, the question of interference 
itself was changed over time, when Sweden’s policy of aid shifted from ‘donor-
driven’ aid with technical assistance to the sectoral support with implication of the 
full integration into the recipient’s economy (idem, 2005: 524). Similarly, Dijkstra 
and White (2002: 494–495) in their broad analysis of Swedish relations with the 
recipient countries in Africa concluded that Sweden has been able to influence 
the recipients’ policies via activities of like-minded groups, formal and informal 
channels, as well as through the maintenance of its expertise and networking 
capacities. 
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In relations with Latvia, Sweden might have been keeping the relatively traditional 
approach of the primary consideration of the recipients’ interests and vision on 
development, as it “did not take the opportunity to make their [Nordic] state 
models accessible to the Latvian politicians and civil servants to nearly the same 
extent as was done in Estonia” (Bennich–Björkman, 2002b: 354). In addition, 
Latvia's orientation and identity lie within the Baltic Sea region – in the sense of 
identity, the country has been defined as the only Baltic (Pabriks and Purs, 2001: 
131; Aalto, 2006: 89). In other words, neither Sweden nor Latvia seemed to be 
willing to incorporate the Nordic model more than get focused on the engagement 
in European affairs. Additionally, it was obvious for Sida the work in the Baltic 
Sea States to be organized separately from the work in developing countries, and 
for a short of time (Isaksson, 2004: 217–219). Generally, this point contributed to 
the notion that Swedish–Latvian bilateral cooperation was, in simple terms, 
limited. 
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The third chapter introduces the theoretical framework of the thesis. Taking into 
account the context provided in the literature review, in this chapter I move on to 
theorise the bilateral relations. I give this focus using the terms of foreign policy 
of aid-giving and Europeanisation. The main assumptions from IR theories have 
been reviewed, and this has led to seeking the balance between realism and 
constructivism addressing the question on how the state policy is determined – 
through the objectives given by the environment or through the process of self-
redefining and / or redefining the reality.  
The theoretical model applied here was proposed by Van der Veen (2011: 39) 
who used seven broad categories to propose the varieties of thinking about aid-
giving policy. These categories or frames are security, power and influence, 
wealth and commercial interests, indirect or enlightened self-interest, reputation 
and self-affirmation, obligation and duty, and humanitarianism. The research gap 
about the (in-)adequacy of each IR theory to give an overall explanation on what 
drives the state actors to behave as they do in aid-giving policy has been 
presented above with the reference to Lancaster (2007:4). The necessity to fulfil 
the gap has led to the proposed model of Veen (2011: 10; 45; see also Table 1; 
2 in Methodology), who encompasses the all dominating interests in IR theories 
and gives them as the whole complexity.  
As for the concept of Europeanization, it is given in the applied meanings of 
rationalist or constructivist behaviour of state-led actors. I suggest that the logic 
of rationalism encompasses the assumptions on the state actor behaviour from 
realism, commercial liberalism, and partly neo-Marxism in terms of economic 
rationale. On the other hand, constructivism is about the sense of commitment to 
certain universe (in a name of Europe), values and norms in relation to the 
enlargement. 
Regarding Sweden as a donor-driven actor, I associate the frames with either the 
self-interest or internationalist commitment in aid-giving policy in a provided 
temporal and spatial context. In other words, I use the proposed model to 
examine why, when and how the country demonstrates its intention to support 
the transition process in three Baltic states. Through the applied meaning of 
Europeanisation, I intend to explain how the prospective of the EU enlargement 
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projected on the provision of development assistance from Sweden to CEE 
countries and particularly Latvia in terms of self-interest (or rationalism) or 
belonging to certain area of Europe with commitment to the common values 
(constructivism).  
3.1. Foreign aid in theories of International Relations: defining the terms, 
understanding the motives 
As was stated in the previous chapter, the interests on the national level occurred 
as the immediate necessity to get adapted to the new post-Cold War 
developments in Europe: being out of the USSR world superpower but with such 
a supranational power as the EU. What follows is a (re-)establishment of the 
subject of interests in Swedish and Latvian policies. The subject considered to be 
given throughout the broader discussion of the aid-giving policy. Such policy may 
be seen as a long-term practice in interstate relations and foreign policy with a 
range of purposes developing over time (cf. Lancaster, 2007; Veen, 2011). 
Central to the entire work is the in-depth analysis of interests in policies 
throughout the discussion of foreign aid in theories of International Relations (IR). 
Throughout the literature each frame of motives can be defined as a response to 
the given changes and challenges of the international system. For instance, 
realism and liberalism operate within their strong orientation on the system 
change. Neo-Marxism and commercial liberalism postulate differently the 
economic importance of interstate relations. ‘Idea’ is a broader term receiving a 
considerable attention from constructivists, which encompasses both the 
international system and state–society relations in the process of interpretation 
of the changes occurred inside and outside. The account of all IR theories allows 
for setting a wide range of purposes of aid-giving policy and describing the inside 
and outside impacts on their formation. However, as was pointed earlier, the 
explanation of the complexity of aid purposes is still problematic.  
This section will discuss the conceptualisation of foreign aid policy in bilateral 
relations. Foreign aid is a question of interest in this research because it has been 
used in the literature (e.g. Bergman, 2006) to refer to the initiation of support from 
Nordic to Baltic states. Moreover, it will be explained below why it is important to 
distinguish ‘development aid / assistance’ from ‘foreign aid’ when discussing the 
foreign policy practice of aid-giving.  
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The term ‘foreign aid’ has been used in such fields of study as political science, 
economy and international relations. In regard to this, one more problem should 
be highlighted. While the shift from objective motives in realist and liberal models 
to the (re-)constructing ideas in constructivism provide with a wider range of 
motives for account, there is a degree of uncertainty on a concrete definition of 
foreign aid. The more general definition is limited to the economic and social 
progress leading to reduction of poverty and better human conditions. Such 
generalisability is problematic for the narrowed focus of the current thesis.  
In the present study of bilateral aid, I will use the definition suggested by 
Lancaster (2007: 9; 10) who saw it as a ‘transfer of public resources from a 
government to another independent government’ identifying that the primary goal 
of the donor’s policy is ‘to better the human condition’ in the recipient country. He 
also proposes a limited definition of ‘development’ referring to ‘economic and 
social progress in poor countries, sustained by economic growth, and leading 
eventually to a reduction in poverty’ (Lancaster, 2007: 10). This view is supported 
by Berthelemy (2006: 184) who identifies ‘poverty alleviation’ as an objective of 
aid-giving and measure of its efficiency, while, according to the author, it depends 
on the governance and quality of economic policies. 
However, as was previously mentioned, such generalisability of the purposes of 
aid-giving in terms of ‘economic and social progress’ or ‘economic growth and 
reduction of power’ leads to the missing of some other purposes (Lancaster, 
2007: 2). The author concludes that not only the issue of ‘why’ should be at the 
heart of our understanding of foreign aid but also ‘how’ this practice has been 
developed or changed over time. At the same time, the general provision of the 
term of ‘development’ does not fully explain whether it is always used to define 
the economic and social progress. Consequently, in the literature the IR theories 
provide the ways of  identification of the motives or goals in foreign aid policy (e.g. 
Lancaster, 2007: 3–4; Veen, 2011: 24–27). In other words,  the theories will lead 
to the framing of the state-centric reflections on how and why to behave in a 
certain manner through the aid-giving policy.   
The overview of each IR theory can be divided into three categories: actors, their 
interests and constraints on the environment by which they operate (Veen, 2011: 
24). Throughout the explanations deriving from the realist tradition in IR, states 
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are the main actors that operate in the anarchic international system (Lancaster, 
2007: 3; Veen, 2011: 24). The nature of international system is defined as the 
‘absence of a supranational coercive authority’ (Noel and Therien, 1995: 525). In 
accordance with that, nation states attempt to distribute their power and 
capabilities driven primarily by their strategic interests in national security, 
geopolitical positioning and ‘self-preservation’ (Noel and Therien, 1995: 525; 
Schraeder, et. al., 1998: 297–298; Berthelemy, 2006: 183; Lancaster, 2007: 3; 
Veen, 2011: 24).  
This perspective, according to Hattori (2003: 229–230), has historically been 
relevant to the Cold War in the competition between the world superpowers 
referred to the Third World. Conclusively, aid-giving policy has been related to 
the ‘high politics’ or ‘hard-headed’ diplomacy (Schraeder, et. al. 1998: 298; 
Lancaster, 2007: 3). Likewise, Veen (2011: 24) assumes that sub-state actors do 
not play an important role in national aid-giving policy. Lancaster (2007: 3) notes 
that during the 1970s and 1980s researchers began the development of models 
accounting quantitative data on foreign aid (e.g. low per capita income or amount 
of trade with donor, etc.) to indicate its purposes. Considering this, he points out 
that these researches strengthen the realist vision on why aid is given. 
Generally, Lancaster (2007: 8) underlines that realism ignores the impact of 
domestic factors and emphasise the dominance of the incentives from 
international system on which state reacts reflectively through the aid provision. 
This theoretical foundation provides with a limited range of interests – security 
and strategic advantages – minimally addressing the issue of economic 
development of the recipients and downplaying their humanitarian needs 
(Schraeder, et. al., 1998: 298). Meanwhile, unlike Schraeder and his co-authors 
(1998: 298) who limited the description of classical realists’ views to the ‘political-
military strategic importance’ of the recipient states, Veen (2011: 25) notes that 
classical realism theory gives state preferences and interests in broader terms by 
taking into account the ‘domestic qualities’ (glory, wealth, etc.). From this point, 
the author comes to the conclusion on that the pre-established realist limitation 
of preferences and interests to security and power looks inadequate and 
problematic (ibid.). At the same time, the state rationality is also questioned. 
According to Galbreath et. al. (2008: 10), the ‘defense’ realism theory states that 
policymakers constantly deal with ‘uncertain and unpredictable information'. 
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Thus, this point criticises the rationality of state as the actor or makes it bounded, 
implying that the state’s reflection on the internal and external outputs is biased. 
For some researchers, (e.g. Noel and Therien, 1995: 525–526; Schcraeder et. 
al., 1998: 298; Lancaster, 2007: 3–4) cooperation between states (re-)emerged 
in the late twentieth century have been reflected within the liberalism, which can 
be also defined in terms of idealism, neoidealism or liberal internationalism 
theory. Whereas the ongoing tendency of interstate relations is described 
similarly, the researchers comes differently to determine the motives. On the one 
side, liberalism advances the vision of economic and trade cooperation benefits 
which, unlike geopolitical or strategic, more states are seeking (Schraeder, et. al., 
1998: 298; Hattori, 2003: 230; Berthelemy, 2006: 183).  
The role of economic rationale is also central to the neo-Marxist paradigm, while 
it is explained in other manner. While for liberalism, foreign policy practice of aid-
giving is developing on the relevant equality of all states in cooperation, neo-
Marxism highlights the and economic exploitation and inequality enhanced by the 
developed states at the centre of world capitalism towards developing countries 
on periphery. On the other side, liberals understand foreign aid as “a projection 
abroad of national values and social forces, as well as an instrument used by 
states to promote interdependence and international justice” with highlighting the 
importance of humanitarian need in foreign aid programmes (Noel and Therien, 
1995: 525–526; Schraeder et. al., 1998: 298). In regard to the widening of focus, 
Veen (2011: 25) points out that liberalism not only takes a developing scope of 
state preferences into account but also considers the sub-state actors, as they 
play an important role in the maintaining of state–society interaction and, thus, 
shaping policy choices and state preferences.  
From the perspective of state–society interaction, the idea that state preferences 
are pre-determined and objectively given has been challenged. Hattori (2003: 
231) argues that the logic of economic and strategic importance cannot 
absolutely explain the emergence of humanitarian and egalitarian ideas, as they 
are taken out of the social context. In the same vein, Veen (2011: 25), in contrast 
to realist and even liberal description of ‘exogenous and stable preferences of 
actors’, introduces the terms of beliefs and perceptions to show up the changing 
manner of state preferences from the more endogenous social context. Lancaster 
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(2007: As Veen (2011: 26) further points out, constructivism utilises explanations 
from realism and liberalism in determination of interests, but its interpretation of 
them differs from what the previously described approaches propose.  
According to that, while conventional IR theories determine the interests as the 
instruments of foreign policy objectives, constructivism recognises ideas as 
determinants of the foreign policy goals or even identifies goals and approaches 
themselves as ideas. This description of the ideas’ role in constructivism is closer 
to the value-oriented version of liberalism. At the same time, constructivism 
incorporates two contexts, domestic and international in the analysis and 
explanation of actors’ preferences and behaviour. For example, Veen (2011: 26, 
italics added) by referring to David Lumsdaine’s Moral Vision and International 
Politics underlines that membership in an international organisation can lead to 
the process of internationalisation of goals and values within the framework of the 
organisation.  
Contributing to this point, Lancaster (2007: 4) argues that policy practices 
followed by goals and values are turning into international norms in interstate 
relations, as in case of a belief about the duty of rich countries to provide 
assistance to poor ones for the better human conditions At the same time, as 
Veen (2011: 27–28) notes, that ideas are fundamental to the (re-)framing of 
national identity, in particular, in international positioning and behaviour. 
Lancaster (2007: 4) drawing on some literature work interpret the aid-giving policy 
of Scandinavian countries through the presence of their social democratic 
tradition. This tradition is also meaningful for Bergman (2006: 76–77), when she 
introduces the concept of ‘adjacent internationalism’ used to refer to Nordic 
internationalist behaviour in regard to the Baltic states in transition to address the 
affection of ‘social embedding values’ on that.  However, she distinguishes the 
broader term of liberalism / liberal internationalism from Nordic internationalism 
emphasising that the latter is a domestic product with the projection abroad (ibid.).  
 Adding more to the point of the role identity in policies, I refer to Alexander Wendt 
(1999: 215) who saw state as a system of relationship between political power 
and, society in which the shared knowledge, the common discourse, ideas and 
interests circulate and form the corporate agency of action. To clarify this, the 
relations between states and the international system, according to Galbreath et. 
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al. (2008: 10) can be described as connected by representation, when, for 
instance, small states policy-makers turn to formulate their own vision of their 
position in the international system, interpret the political, social, historical and 
some other experiences and legacies.  
On the question of (in-)adequacy of IR theories Lancaster (2007: 4) states that 
none of them can fully explain the complexity of aid-giving purposes. Veen (2011: 
26) states the lack of explanation from constructivism on the role played by ideas 
in preferences formation and evolution, which is also ignored or underestimated 
in realist and liberal models. An attempt to utilise both international and domestic 
pressures raises up the issue of ‘where do they [the interests] come from?’(ibid.). 
Addressing the issue, Lancaster (2007: 8–9) presents several approaches to 
conceptualise the interaction between domestic and international developments 
over the provision of foreign aid. According to that, the first approach is that the 
feature of the international system mostly determines the range of motives in aid-
giving policy, as realism states. The second mediates the international trends and 
framing of policy choices by taking into account the basic elements of domestic 
policy – bureaucracies, political institutions, interest groups, and values and 
identities. The third approach examines the influence of external factor on the 
basic elements with an attempt to explain when and how it takes the place.  
The first section of the chapter has shown that the discussion of national policy 
of foreign aid (or development assistance, if the development purpose becomes 
fundamental in certain policy) by IR scholars is mainly based on the assumptions 
about how the state (or state-led) actors determine the origin of motives. In other 
words, whether they are identified as given by the external environment or 
interpreted by domestic actors. The next section will go on to address this issue 
through the concept of Europeanisation, closely linked in some studies (e.g. Jano, 
2013) with the initiated process of the EU enlargement referred to the CEE 
countries. 
3.2. The “EU enlargement-led Europeanization”: mapping the research 
agenda  
The following part of the thesis moves on to present the concept of 
Europeanization referring to the analysis of the EU enlargement process from the 
1990s in relation to the former socialist CEE countries (cf. Grabbe, 2003; Jano, 
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2016). This section continues the pre-established discussion of realist and 
constructivist assumptions. It will attempt to account the realist and constructivist 
approaches from the previous chapter linking them with how the state-led actors 
regard themselves with the EU enlargement and what are the effects.  
The subject of effects is important for the definition of Europeanization in a given 
context. The general constitution of adaptation to the EU norms or projection of 
national interests and influence might prevail, however, it is not sufficient. 
Through the in-depth analysis of some other mechanisms, for example, identity 
reconstruction, Europeanization describes a more multiple phenomenon of how 
states adhere themselves to the EU membership. While the overestimation of the 
EU influence is a matter of criticism, it generates some new insights in the (re-
)framing of a state behaviour, whether proposing through the realist of 
constructivist lenses. The issue is the concept usability in the broader discussion 
of potential EU membership of countries from CEE (to which three Baltic states 
are also related – see, for example: Grabbe, 2003: 304). In this section, I will also 
follow the argument from Stavridis’ review (2003: 4), according to which there is 
a ‘common research practice’ of selecting the preferred definition with intention 
to apply this further to the undertaken empirical analysis.  
I begin with indication of difficulties in defining the concept and then consider the 
subject of application of meanings. For Featherstone (2003: 12) and Wong (2011: 
136) Robert Ladrech was the first who suggested the definition of 
Europeanisation. According to the authors, Europeanisation is a process of 
national adaptation to the EU norms, imperatives and politics in the way of 
redefinition of their own interests and behaviour. Meanwhile, comparing this 
school of thought with the second one provided by himself, Wong (idem, 137) 
raises up the question of dominance in EU–member state relations. On the one 
side, through the term of ‘national adaptation’ the significance of the EU as a point 
of political reference may be claimed (idem, 136). On the other side, however, 
the state actors, while being the agents of the nationally defined objectives and 
proponents of changes on the EU level, cannot be seen as passive appropriators 
of the effects from the EU membership (idem, 137).   De Flers and Müller (2010) 
were also the proponents of the separated examination of ‘top-down’ process 
related to the national adaptation, and ‘down-top’ process of transmitting the 
national policy objectives into the EU body.  
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Another significant aspect countering the state’s passivism is whether the state 
actors automatically identify their belonging to certain values. In relation to this, 
Olsen (2002: 927) states the presence of challenge for ideational factor as well. 
He saw the challenge as that some identities, beliefs or obligations in the overall 
construction may not be activated, even though they may be internalised. Such 
considerations return us to the issue of the theoretical foundations attributing to 
the EU and member or candidate state relations in the process of enlargement. 
So far as this research is related to the years from 1990 to 2004, I suggest the 
question of what Sweden may project more, self-interest or commitment, on the 
level of development cooperation with CEE. Conclusively, I can equally refer to 
rationalism and constructivism. 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005: 12) refer to the rationalist theory to 
prescribe the determinant role of costs and benefits taken into account by state-
led actors in regard to the EU enlargement. The authors claim that ‘states favour 
the kind and degree of horizontal institutionalism that maximizes their benefits’ 
(ibid., italics added). I take into account three categories of costs and benefits 
proposed by the authors: transaction (management), policy and autonomy (ibid.). 
Transaction costs, while require the organisation of infrastructure and 
development of communication, maximises the benefits of the provision of 
services and strengthening of cooperation and coordination between old and new 
member states. Policy costs are related to the sharing of common goods with 
new member states contributing to the process of their national adaptation. 
Lastly, autonomy costs imply the loss of policy-making autonomy as a result from 
the active involvement in the organisation decision-making and / or political 
development of the applicant countries. Consequently, the rationalist approach 
provides the gains of security, power, wealth, influence, etc. that the state-led 
actors may seek from enlargement (idem, 13).  
Constructivism offers a supra-state level of analysis on which state-led actors 
associate themselves in a certain degree with the international community 
represented by the international organisation and share the values giving the 
sense of commitment. In a form of general hypothesis Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier (idem, 15) proposes the following statement:  
the more an external state identifies with the international community that 
the organization represents and the more it shares the values and norms 
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that define the purpose and the policies of the organization, the stronger 
the institutional ties it seeks with this organization and the more the 
member states are willing to pursue horizontal institutionalization with this 
state. 
From this foundation, the fundamental question to the EU membership is where 
a member or candidate state is ‘European’ in its demonstration of the commitment 
to the organisation and values identified as common. This normative component 
has been prescribed by Brommesson (2010: 228) in his concept of ‘normative 
Europeanisation’ in relation to the Swedish post-Cold War foreign policy 
reorientation. The author uses the concept for two reasons.  
First, he supports the understanding of the EU as a normative power which has 
been strengthened as an effect in member and applicant states relations, while 
they appropriate the EU norms and regulations with the commitment to the 
European centre. Second, the author examines the effects of changes in Swedish 
foreign policy from the 1990s expressed in a more optimistic vision of Europe by 
Swedish politicians and increased interest in activism which appropriates the 
post-Cold War developments in Europe and the immediate neighbourhood of 
Baltic states (idem,  233–237). Similarly, Wong (2011: 138, italics added) 
proposes the meaning of ‘identity reconstruction’ to refer to the redefinition of 
norms, values and national identity towards the prioritising of ‘European’ attitudes 
and objectives implemented through elite socialisation (like in case of optimism 
on ‘Europe’ among some of the Swedish politicians). The main difference 
between Brommesson’s ‘normative Europeanization’ (2010) and Bergman’s 
‘adjacent internationalism’ (2006) is that while the values and norms are 
interpreted in the context of belonging to Europe through the first concept, they 
have been prescribed as a product of domestic welfare projected abroad through 
the internationalist behaviour.  
Jano (2013: 63) uses the term ‘EU enlargement-led Europeanisation’ to refer to 
the overall process of EU integration, which has an impact on the candidate 
states. In simple terms, according to Jane (ibid.), the process of Europeanisation 
in regard to such applicants as CEE countries, is a process of ‘member-state 
building’ and becoming Europe-like through the adaption to the EU norms and 
practices. In a same vein, Wong (2011: 139) uses the term of ‘modernisation’ to 
refer to the transition to democracy, market economy on the way to EU 
membership. Both Jano (ibid.) and Grabbe (2003: 304) indicate that the process 
 
 
31 
 
of Europeanisation was relevant to the countries of CEE, as they faced the same 
pressure of adaptation to the acquis communautaire1. Following Radaelli (2003: 
30), Grabbe (idem, 309) presents the Europeanisation as a multitude process 
consisting of Europeanization consists of processes of  
(a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and 
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things', 
and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in 
the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic 
(national and subnational) discourse, identities, political structures, and 
public policies. 
Further, Grabbe (idem, 310–312) suggests three explanations to differentiate 
Europeanisation from some other attempts to theorise the effects from the EU. 
First, while Europeanisation in respect to the countries of CEE has been 
addressing the EU enlargement, Europeanisation is not a synonym. This term is 
used to represent a consequent effect of enlargement. Second, the extent of the 
EU influence must be interpreted with caution as it is often exaggerated by EU 
politicians or member / applicant state governments, who promotes the 
enlargement as a driving force of socio-economic transition and political reforms 
in CEE. Some optimism on the EU membership system development may be 
seen in the term of ‘policy isomorphism’ proposed by Wong (2011: 139) as 
describing the advanced level of socialisation and convergence. As a result, 
member states “begin to emulate one other regarding the particular policy choices 
of policy frameworks”. The third, which referred to the previous, is that not all 
effects of EU are intentional as they might appear in the areas of minimal EU 
compliance if any (for instance, constitutional model building).  
The next question relating to the work of Grabber (idem, 312–317) is ‘what is 
Europeanised’? In other words, what measures brings the effectiveness of certain 
policies? On the question, the author proposes several categories of mechanisms 
used by the EU: 
- Policies, legislative and institutional templates, ‘downloaded’ from the EU 
level (harmonization and acquis communautaire). 
- Aid and technical assistance transferred to the CEE recipients. 
- Monitoring of applicants’ conditionality for membership. 
- Twinning and consultations in public administration. 
                                                          
1 Grabbe (ibid.) defines this term as the sum of all potential rights and obligations existing in the 
EU institutional framework or system of EU law and or practice. 
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- Access to negotiations on the EU membership.  
In this paragraph, I refer to the conceptualisation of a degree of Europeanisation 
provided in some of the literature (e.g. Orbie and Carbone, 2016: 4) in terms of 
absorption, accommodation and transformation. Absorption is a low degree of 
Europeanization characterised by the appropriation of certain aspects of 
European policy without modification of a national policies, processes and 
institutions. Accommodation means ‘adapting existing processes, policies, and 
institutions without changing their essential features and the underlying collective 
understandings attached to them’ (ibid). Lastly, transformation is a high degree 
process of replacement of the existing components of political organization by the 
new ones. All the terms can be seen as a maintenance of a question of extent to 
which the Europeanisation took place if the national policy framework is regarded. 
The research focus has been limited to the discussion of post-Cold War 
developments in Swedish and Latvian policies. It has also been provided with a 
wider account of Nordic–Baltic relations, as three Baltic states also constituted 
the CEE countries in a literature (Grabbe, 2003). With the provision of general 
information in the theoretical chapter, I attempted to narrow a focus down in the 
theorising. Such attempt has been made in the discussion of Europeanization 
concept by linking this with the enlargement of CEE countries. 
The next two chapters will present a selected methodology and empirical analysis 
of Swedish foreign policy of development assistance towards Latvia in 1990–
2004. It is hoped these chapters will establish a fruitful discussion of the topic 
developing what has been overviewed before.  
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4. METHODOLOGY 
The research has been undertaken to develop the idea on Swedish foreign aid 
towards Latvia in 1990–2004 as a concrete practice of foreign aid policy as an 
empirical case of Europeanization. In other words, my hypothesis is that 
Sweden’s aid-giving policy was acting as a tool of Swedish post-Cold War 
Europeanization through the support of Latvia as one of the Baltic states in 
transition. The literature review provides with a background information showing 
up to what extent Sweden demonstrated its support to Latvia on the future EU 
membership. The theoretical framework addressed the issues of the motives of 
aid-giving policy in IR and Europeanization as conceptualization of the 
modernisation set for the membership purpose. As an account of the demand for 
testing and contribution to what has been previously given in, the following 
chapter is about the research design. Before proceeding the analysis, I describe 
the methods and collecting data.  
4.1. Content analysis in documentation study 
The purpose of the analytical work established in this research is a greater 
understanding of the topic. In following the purpose, as Frey (2018: 546) states, 
documentary analysis is a form of qualitative research offering a systemic 
procedure of study as primary as secondary sources. The term of ‘secondary 
types’ of documentary data is used to refer to the account of primary data 
developed through the process of analysis or interpretation and published to a 
wider audience (ibid.). Summarizing the reviewed literature C. Williams (2015: 
198) builds up three ways of the usage of the documents for the research 
purposes: ‘as the basis for the literature review’, ‘as a source of specific evidence’ 
and ‘for documentary analysis’. I consider myself to be interested in utilizing of all 
these ways.  
Previously, I have been following the systemic approach in the description of the 
context of Swedish foreign development aid policy to Latvia in terms of post-Cold 
war changes in European affairs, the EU enlargement, and, finally, the transition 
process taken place in Sweden and Latvia in quite different ways but for quite a 
similar reason. I also discussed two theoretical frameworks developed in the 
reviewed literature. The first is about the motives of the foreign aid policy of a 
 
 
34 
 
donor and the second is the concept of Europeanization I have intended to 
discuss in accordance with some part of the system changes in post-Cold war 
European affairs. The socio-economic modernization of CEE has been 
categorized at once as a matter of aid-giving and processes named as 
Europeanization (Lancaster, 2007: 15; Wong, 2011: 139). Hence, the hypothesis 
has the following continuation that Swedish aid-giving policy has been a 
contribution to Latvia’s Europeanization, whereas this policy has been also 
Europeanized. For the purpose of testing of the proposed hypothesis I intend to 
resort to the qualitative content analysis method, which is known as used for the 
analysis of documents (Elo and Kyngäs, 2008: 108).  
There are several key features of the method provided in the existing body of 
literature. Generally, the researchers utilise content analysis to link the collected 
data with statement of the research question, establishment of the context, 
revision of the previous knowledge and a broader description of the phenomenon 
(Elo and Kyngäs, 2008: 108). While content analysis shares such features of 
qualitative analysis methods as ‘concern with meanings and interpretation’, in 
contrast to these methods, it offers an effective way of reduction the amount of 
textual material towards the provision of the focus on the ‘selected aspects of 
meaning’ with ‘making sense of them’ (Julien, 2008; Schreier, 2014).   
The second advantage of using the content analysis, which some writers (e.g. 
Veen, 2011: 33; Schreier, 2014) indicate, is that it avoids the problem of 
overestimation of one’s explanation or assumption provided by the researcher. In 
other words, content analysis usually sets a number of alternatives for 
examination. In relation to this advantage, Schreier (ibid.) also describes the 
method as highly systematic requiring a procedural examination of every unit of 
textual material. In literature this examination is usually defined in terms of 
codifying and categorizing (e.g. Gioia, et.al., 2012: 20–24; Saldana, 2013). The 
third advantage of flexibility is also related to the previous one – according to 
Schreier (ibid.) one code may include ‘varying portions of concept-driven and 
data-driven categories’.  
The last subject I concern about in this section is how to conduct the content 
analysis. For example, Elo and Kyngäs (2018: 109–112) divide the overall 
procedure into three categories: preparation phase, organising phase, and final 
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reporting which I present further. In a preparation phase, a researcher states the 
problem, aim and research question and hypotheses. Having formed them, the 
researcher collects data, frames the codes from units on single words or phrases 
in the text. The codes then will be combined into broader categories. After 
generation of categories, the researcher moves on to the abstraction, which 
means the general description of the research topic linking with the categories. 
Referring to the same phase, Saldana (2013: 41–57) uses the term of ‘analytical 
memos’ provided as a written reflection on the previous knowledge and complex 
work on data. The overall analytical, procedural and intellectual work is usually 
presented as a final accord in the discussion of research findings.  
After the general provision of information about the selected method, I give a 
small note on two types of categorization in content analysis proposed by Elo and 
Kyngäs (ibid.). The researchers divide the analysis into inductive and deductive. 
The selection of type is based on whether the researcher utilizes the previous 
knowledge and developments putting them in a new context (deductive) or 
consider oneself to organize the data through coding and categorizing the 
research material (inductive).  
This section has given a brief introduction of the research method I intend to use. 
It has reviewed the key features of content analysis giving reasons it was 
adopted. The rationalization of the selection went on the argument that content 
analysis as a procedural form of qualitative method allows to consider many 
alternatives and, consequently, reduce the risk of myopic vision of the research 
issue. The analysis conducted in the Master’s Thesis will be based on 
documentation study. As was mentioned at the beginning of this section, it allows 
to put some insights into the previous knowledge from the literature review. 
Whereas the present section introduced the method, the section that follows 
moves on to explain in greater detail the organisation of content analysis for the 
current research.  
4.2. Building on the categories  
I begin the following section by referring to A. M. Veen (2011: 53) who used the 
content analysis for proceeding with sources on foreign aid policy. The author’s 
choice is based on the intention to make a qualitative account of the words or 
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phrases related to development issues and subjectively reproduced through the 
textual materials of legislative debates (ibid). The following table presents the 
author’s ‘frames and goals’ model.  
Table 2. The seven broad frames relevant to aid policy 
Frame Goals for aid 
Security Increase donor’s physical security: support allies, 
oppose Communism, etc. 
Power / influence 
international fora 
Pursue power: increase leverage over others, win 
allies and positions of influence in 
 
Wealth / economic self-
interest 
Further economic interests of donor economy; 
support export industries 
Enlightened self-
interest  
 
Pursue global public goods: peace, stability, 
environmental health, population control, etc. 
Reputation / self-
affirmation  
 
Establish and express a certain identity in 
international relations; improve international status and 
reputation 
Obligation / duty  
 
Fulfil obligations, whether historical or associated 
with position in international system 
 
Humanitarianism 
 
Promote the well-being of the poorest groups 
worldwide; provide humanitarian relief 
Source: Veen, 2011: 10. 
Veen (ibid.) describes the range of frames as a useful tool for explaining and 
maintaining the significance of aid-giving policy. As the author shows in Appendix 
B from his work (ibid.), each frame represents a category into which certain 
pieces of data are combined with codifying, and the pieces themselves may be 
referred to several frames at once. It is necessary to note, in accordance with the 
previously stated problem of overestimation, the latter feature plays a critical role 
in provision of alternative components to address the issue of what lays beyond 
aid-giving policy. In addition, the author incorporates two polarised views on the 
dominates of development assistance in national policy: rationalism nominated 
as ‘self-interest’ and humanitarianism as a form of caretaking about the recipient’s 
needs (idem, 9).  
Turning to another significant aspect, I return to the developments in the work of 
Lancaster (2007: 18–23), which I have already mentioned in the last section of 
theoretical chapter. He encompasses four categories of domestic factors in a 
shape of the national foreign policy of aid provision: ideas, interests, institutions 
and organizations. Previously mentioned ideational component is presented by 
the author in terms of ‘worldviews’ referred to the construction of certain values 
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and norms justifying the appropriate or inappropriate behaviour in accordance 
with social practices or international trends (idem, 18). In regard to the latter, 
Brommesson (2010: 231–232) defines the ‘worldview’ as a certain vision of 
universe (or areas of universe like ‘Europe’).  
The ‘worldviews’ are linked with ‘principled beliefs’ or expectations of actions in 
accordance with behavior of aid-giving country’s identity, and ‘causal beliefs’ or 
sorts of policies leading to the effective development (Lancaster, 2007: 18–19). 
The three other categories form the organizational patterns of aid-giving dealing 
with the decision makers, groups of interest with their capacity to change the 
tangle of the aid purposes, and sectors within which foreign aid policy has been 
manifested presumably through the exercise of causal beliefs (idem, 19–23). I 
used the thematic names of codes in the process of empirical analysis generally 
framed in certain goals, approaches and measures in Swedish aid-giving policy 
towards CEE countries. In the section on Europeanization, I gave the list of 
mechanisms referring to the work of Grabbe (ibid). By such means, the author 
proceeds the explanation of how the EU provides the conditionality for 
membership. I apply the same logic for Swedish aid-giving policy to examine what 
policy measures have been introduced for the increasing of the effectiveness of 
development assistance / cooperation.  
The second research question concerns the objectives of Swedish foreign policy 
of development assistance to the Baltic states and Latvia in particular and how 
these objectives correlate with what has been prescribed in the conceptual 
framework of Europeanization. I consider this question as referred to the testing 
of previous knowledge. This description has been given earlier in term of 
deductive justification.  In other words, I combine the abovementioned 
developments from Lancaster and Veen’s works putting them in the new context 
which I investigate. This context is a promotion of social and economic reforms 
has become a part of foreign aid policy towards former socialist countries to 
support changes in legal system, political and economic institutions since the 
1990s (Lancaster, 2007: 15). As a result of combination, I go on to suggest the 
following analytical framework for this research in Table 3: 
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Table 3. The suggested model of analysis  
Worldview Frames (Codes) Beliefs 
Justification of certain 
values / international 
trends in foreign policy 
behavior 
The frames of coding: 
- A transformative 
development of the 
indicated 
geographical area 
(CEE, Baltic states, 
Latvia) 
- Changes / 
perception of 
changes in sectors / 
areas of action 
(security, economy, 
social sector) 
Principled  
(expected 
behaviour) 
Causal  
(policy measures 
introduced to make 
a certain foreign 
policy course 
effective) 
Security (self-
determined security, 
defence and safety 
patterns) 
The frames of 
subcoding: 
- Purposes in 
each frame 
(except 
reputation); 
- Image 
(related to the 
reputation) 
 
 The frames of 
subcoding: 
- Transfer of know-
how; 
- Transfer of 
money; 
- Organisation 
a) Sectoral 
support; 
b) the impact of the 
future EU 
membership.  
 
Power (strategic 
importance, alliances, 
influence) 
Wealth (economic, 
trade importance) 
Enlightened self-
interest (related to 
sounds of international 
affection, or global 
public goods provision) 
Reputation / self-
affirmation (positioning 
in the international 
system, status, national 
identity, value) 
Obligation (duties and 
responsibility coming 
from reputation) 
Humanitarianism / well-
being (human aspects: 
values, beliefs, rights, 
etc.) 
What to account: 
- Association of frames with assumptions from rationalism (three costs and benefits: 
transaction, policy, autonomous) and constructivism (sharing values, sense of commitment) 
 
Sources: Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier,2005; Lancaster, 2007; Veen, 2011: 10; 45–46. 
4.3. Data sources 
Having discussed how to construct the analytical framework for the research, I 
will now move on to present the data sources. I used the open data from the 
official websites of Swedish government addressing specifically to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (Government Offices of Sweden: government.se), Swedish 
parliament of Riksdag(-en) (riksdagen.se) and Sida (sida.se). The choice of the 
open data can be explained not only by the availability. The information from the 
available sources reflects on the final outcomes or intermediate results from 
Swedish aid-giving policy to CEE countries. 
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All the textual information has been translated into English by the authors 
provided this. I used two info brochures and a foreign policy yearbook dated back 
to the year of 2000 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as they summarise the 
Swedish policy of development cooperation with CEE countries. Considering the 
primary sources available in English I collected a Government bill 2002 on 
Swedish participation in global development cooperation, and two reports of 
inquiry from Riksdag. In relation to Sida, I collected the evaluation reports 
containing information on geographical area of study and organisation of 
assistance in different sectors. In relation to Latvia, the most valuable source is a 
results analysis from Sida as it contains the information on development 
cooperation with Latvia, which is relevant to the lack of detailed description of 
Sweden’s cooperation to CEE countries (cf. Roman and Sandgren, 1998: 2).  
The account of the sufficient amount of data is problematic as this is a question 
of language proficiency, when the non-included data is available in Swedish only. 
Such question is one of the aspects of the entire issue of methodological 
challenges. Meeting the challenges is crucial for the maintenance of the quality 
of the research. As it deserves some attention, I will turn to this in the next section.  
4.4. Addressing the issue of methodological challenges 
In the final section of the fourth chapter, I present an issue of methodological 
challenges indicated in the literature. Some of the challenges have already been 
mentioned previously, and some of them has yet to be.  
One of the main challenges is related to the organisation of analysis described 
generally by Veen (2011: 49) as how to convert the raw textual material into the 
useful qualitative measures of frames. Such challenge arises as a result from that 
the goals of aid-giving policy are not obvious and should be interpreted from the 
process of measurement (idem, 2).  
The second challenge is referred to the account of actors. As was mentioned in 
the theoretical chapter, IR paradigms attribute to this issue differently. For realism 
state is a main driver of process, while the other foundations allow for the 
consideration of sub-state actors, international organisations, etc. In the empirical 
analysis such risk might appear through the overestimation of the role played by 
certain actors. As discussed above, this risk has been caused by the 
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exaggeration of the EU enlargement effects on either the domestic political 
changes or the international environment. Returning briefly to the ‘EU 
enlargement’, I resort to the statement about the terminology puzzling, which is 
also relevant to such terms as ‘foreign aid / development assistance’ or 
‘Europeanization’. The difference between all these terms was presented 
previously, and it is also necessary to get accounted, as we are dealing with 
certain purpose of development and the effects caused by the EU enlargement 
in term of Europeanization. Similarly, the question referred to the Swedish 
development cooperation of 1990–2004 with the Baltic states is in what aspects 
it can be identified as a provider of Europeanization and in what aspects it was 
Europeanized itself (cf. Danielson and Wohlgemuth, 2005: 527–528). In a 
broader perspective it is also challengeable to distinguish the EU impact from 
some other effects in the international environment prescribed in term of 
‘independent variables’ (Orbie and Carbone, 2016: 5–6). 
To sum the section up, the degree of uncertainty on the terms and concepts used 
in this research following through the review of the literature may cause a sense 
of ambiguity in empirical analysis. Despite that the selected method of qualitative 
content analysis attempt to consider all the produced alternatives, the issue of 
the interpretation of data results remains critical.  
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5. ANALYTICAL CHAPTER: SWEDEN’S DEVELOPMENT 
COOPERATION WITH BALTIC STATES IN TRANSITION 
5.1. Reporting the results from analysis: the wider area of the Baltic states 
with the focus on Latvia 
5.1.1. Worldview: the representation of the Baltic transition in the Swedish 
development assistance policy 
As was previously indicated, this research considers two post-Cold War 
processes: the Baltic states transition and the EU enlargement. These processes 
have become relevant for the country of Sweden, as they took place in the 
immediate neighbourhood. Regarding this, I follow the argument by Brommesson 
(2010: 233) who stated that the account of the changes occurred in the close 
vicinity that time is useful for the in-depth analysis of Swedish foreign policy 
reorientation.  
One of the main tasks of this sub-section is to represent the Swedish reflections 
on the major post-Cold War transformations in Europe expressed in the country’s 
development assistance policy. For this purpose, I use the category of 
‘worldview’, which has been previously discussed in the chapter on Methodology. 
The term can be defined as the correlation between the international trends or 
certain vision of territory and the behaviour of the actor (cf. Lancaster, 2007: 18; 
Brommesson, 2010: 231–232). 
To begin with, I indicate significance as the main theme of Swedish reflection on 
the Baltic transition. In other words, the process of rapid change within the Baltic 
states as well as their movement towards democracy in a form of governance 
and market economy through the reform process has been evaluated as 
‘significant upheaval’ (Hedborg, 1998: 7), ‘historic transformation’ (Hedborg, 
2002: 7; see also: Sida, 1997: 20), or ‘transformative development’ (Government 
Offices of Sweden [Government Bill 2002/03:122], 2004: 17). Whereas all CEE 
countries were undergoing the process of transition, some priority has been given 
to the Baltic states with inclusion of Poland (e.g. Hedborg, 2002: 8). These 
countries, according to the data source (ibid.), ‘share the same cultural heritage’ 
and ‘are linked by common history’.  
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In regard to the previous point, I introduce the next frame of coding related to the 
worldview. Joining to the EU expressed earlier as a top priority of the Baltic 
transition may be seen in the empirical analysis as a multidimensional frame. The 
first dimension notes the application of the countries for the EU membership as 
an important change taking place in Eastern Europe, which is equally important 
for Western Europe intensifying the process of the EU enlargement (Hedborg, 
1998; Hedborg, 2002). Second, considering the EU membership as a goal and 
driving force of the efforts from donor-recipient sides of Sweden and the Baltic 
republics (cf. Eduards, 2004: 16–17), this may be practically evaluated as an area 
of indicating the  transition problems (Government Offices of Sweden 
[Government Bill 2002/03:122], 2004) as a solution when the applicant countries 
have intended to join to the freedom, security and justice area within the Union 
(Riksdagen [SOU 1997: 159], 1997). 
At the same time, the support of the EU enlargement means bringing the common 
goods of security, wealth, justice, etc. to old and new states in Europe (cf. 
Hedborg, 2002). In other words, the next coding frame I develop here derives 
from the previously mentioned priority to join the EU and encompasses the 
changes and challenges in a set of sectors on which Sweden has had expressed 
its worldview.  The account of challenges is important, as it shows up that the 
nomination of significance does not fully constitute the understanding of 
transition. The shift from one system to another has been recognised as 
problematic (cf. Hedborg, 1998: 8). Regarding the subject of development 
cooperation, such addition is crucial, as it hints to the areas of cooperation on the 
problem-solving basis (ibid.). 
One of the important aspects of the EU enlargement is that the transition to 
democracy and market economy has received the applied meaning. For instance, 
democratisation, while being the overall process revealed in transition, serves in 
the analysis as a frame of coding with two concrete meanings. The first meaning 
establishes democratisation as a form of support towards government central 
structures and institutions, fair distribution of resources, pluralism, increasing 
participation of civilians, etc. (see: Government Offices of Sweden [Yearbook], 
2000: 9).  The second meaning presents democratisation as a political principle 
or value promoting the civil respect of law and legal system, the expression of 
honesty in accountability from the official structures and institutions within the 
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country, and, lastly, the guarantee of equal rights, constructive cooperation and 
security within the society (ibid.).  As for marketisation, it has been understood as 
the establishment of economy system with the ‘freer rules’, which is easier the 
regulate for the interests of trade and enterprise (Hedborg, 1998: 24).  
From the overall point of view, democratisation was the main change in the 
international system and one of the common objectives in transition and occurred, 
in the general meaning, as a form of structural support and ideational promotion 
from the Swedish side. As a result, transition to the market economy is also 
considered to adjust the applicant countries to the EU rules and regulations 
(Hedborg, 2002: 15).  
The change towards democratic governance and market economy also requires 
the promotion of social stability. Whereas there has been a lack of institutional 
support and working service with respect to the rule of law, many forms of 
organised crime or illegal behaviour have existed to a varying extent (Sida, 1997: 
20–21). The problems arising in the transiting countries have been the 
unemployment, deteriorating social security and gender inequality – here women 
and children have been recognised as situated in a zone of risk (cf. Hedborg, 
1998: 25; see also: Government Offices of Sweden, 2000 [Yearbook]).  
The next aspect is related to the evaluation of the new international reality through 
the broad term of ‘security’. The key features of the state of security provides a 
contradictive vision. On the one side, the security policy situation has been 
characterised as leaving out the confrontation from the past times of the Cold 
War while, on the other, it has been presented as uncertain and unforeseeable in 
the future (Hedborg, 2002). At the previous points, the issue of justice and home 
affairs is at the heart of our understanding of as the challenges within the country 
as the problematic state of security in the region. On the first question, the 
problem has been caused by the lack of independent administration in justice 
with the less respect from citizens to the legal system (Hedborg, 1998). On the 
second, the guarantees of stability in justice and home affairs is essential to fulfil 
obligations to the EU and promote trust and support in relations between old 
members and new, while the ‘soft security’ issues of safer borders and illegal 
migration has been also relevant (Riksdagen [SOU 1997:159], 1997).  
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In the first part of the section, the subject of worldview in Swedish foreign policy 
towards the Baltic states in transition has been discussed. In the second part I 
will report the more concrete aspects of Swedish aid-giving policy in a given area 
of action. 
5.1.2. Derived from the conditions: principled and causal beliefs  
The category of ‘worldview’ constitutes the official representation of the close 
European environment, in which Sweden had to conduct its development 
assistance policy since the end of the Cold War. In the following part of the 
section, I will turn to the subcategories related to the worldview and described in 
the methodological chapter in terms as principled and causal beliefs. On the 
question of Swedish aid-giving policy, what follows is the discussion of the 
expected behaviour with certain policies of the donor in accordance with the 
international processes and / or (re-)imagining national identity (cf. Lancaster, 
2007). To consider the certain measures, which has been introduced by the 
Swedish aid-giving actor for the increase of effectiveness of providing assistance, 
I refer to the frames of coding from the work of Veen (2011: 10).  
I begin with the codes of principled beliefs and turn first to frame of security. It 
was earlier mentioned that the understanding of security has been changed over 
the time. Primarily, security was associated with the support of sovereignty of the 
newly independent Baltic states (Eduards, 2004: 7). The new challenges and 
changes occurred in the Baltic neighbourhood initiated the account of non-military 
aspects of security: crime, border control, illegal migration, civil security, etc 
(Hedborg, 1998: 17; Government Offices of Sweden, 2000 [Yearbook]: 178; 
Hedborg, 2002: 12; Eduards, 2004: 7).  
It is important to note that the Swedish objective of development assistance policy 
has been shifted from the primary support of Baltic states sovereignty to the 
security-enhancing cooperation in area of Europe. Here I use the frame of the 
enlightened self-interest (Veen, 2011: 10) related to the Swedish side of 
cooperation. This frame reflects the Swedish internationalist behaviour, revealed 
mainly through the commitment to the promotion of such values or global public 
goods as peace, democracy, sustainable development, economic growth, social 
development (Hedborg, 2002), and sovereignty (Eduards, 2004) in the Baltic 
states and their surroundings. In relation to the Baltic states, the security-
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enhancing-cooperation has had an applying meaning, as it was established to 
remove the barriers (Hedborg, 1998: 8) and facilitate the Baltic integration with 
the EU (Eduards, 2004: 7–8).  
The exercise of Swedish power can be prescribed through the establishment of 
the new political and economic ties with the Baltic recipients as well as the 
support of the improvements appeared in national economies and policies 
(Hedborg, 1998: 7). Two key aspects have been associated with the subject of 
influence. The first is the decentralised cooperation between parties and 
agencies of cooperation in Sweden and Baltic states, named also was ‘twinning 
cooperation’ (e.g.  Government Offices of Sweden, 2000 [Yearbook]: 179). The 
second is exerting of influence on the international organisations for gaining more 
attention from them on Swedish–Baltic cooperation (ibid.). Another aspect of 
power which is necessary to indicate is a reduction of Swedish influence via 
‘phase out’ of cooperation to a more stable form of ‘normal neighbourhood’ within 
the state of the EU membership (Olesen, et.al., 2001: 1; 8; Eduards, 2004: 20).  
The general willingness to support the Baltic transition and accession to the EU 
leads to the self-affirmation of Sweden as a relevant, flexible and valuable 
contributor playing a naturally leading role in the Baltic development, the 
importance of which has been increasing under the forthcoming EU enlargement 
(Hedborg, 1998; Hedborg, 2002; Government Offices of Sweden [Government 
Bill 2002/03:122], 2004). Within the transiting countries, the establishment of 
decentralised cooperation has been considered as promotion of the Swedish 
profile in CEE countries (Government Offices of Sweden [Yearbook], 2000: 179). 
At this point, the principled obligation taken by Sweden is to support the overall 
process of development within the Baltic states on the way to the EU membership 
(Riksdagen, 1998 [SOU 1998: 86]; Hedborg, 1998; Hedborg, 2002; Eduards, 
2004). 
The humanitarian aspect of development cooperation may be associated with the 
area of justice and home affairs, which embodies several meanings. The first is 
the promotion of people’s faith in the rule of law and judicial system representing 
by police, law courts, public prosecution authorities, prison and probation service, 
etc. (Government Offices of Sweden [Yearbook], 2000: 178). The second has 
been associated with the necessity to adhere to the EU, which has been 
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regulating the ‘third pillar’ of justice and home affairs via Amsterdam and 
Maastricht treaties (Riksdagen, 1997 [SOU 1997:159]; Cameron, 2003: 2). The 
latter has been specifically related to the support of the proper functioning of 
social system and gender equality contributing to the wealth and economic 
development (e.g. Sida, 1997: 22).  
The causal beliefs form the second subcategory returning us to the question of 
what has been Europeanised (cf. Grabbe, 2003: 312–317) or committed to the 
theme of the EU enlargement in Swedish aid-giving policy. It is important to 
mention that the certain measures, which will be presented below, played a 
pivotal role in gaining the support from the EU in a form of technical and/or 
financial assistance to the municipalities of the transiting countries (e.g. Olesen, 
et.al., 2001: 20) and to Sweden on the basis of co-financing (Riksdagen [SOU 
1998: 86], 1998: 13). Following Grabber (ibid.), I propose the coding frames of 
money, know-how and institutional organisation of the support.   
Money has been one of the primary sources of support in each sector of 
cooperation. Millions and billions of SEK have been allocated for the enhancing 
of security cooperation, establishing networks and ties, to affirm itself as a 
valuable contributor (see: Hedborg, 1998; Hedborg, 2002). A considerable 
amount of money was channelled via the EU Phare and Tacis programmes – 
SEK 1,84 billion (Government Offices of Sweden [Yearbook], 2000: 177).  
The organisational support has been introduced in the sources (e.g. Hedborg, 
1998; Government Offices of Sweden [Yearbook], 2000; Olesen, et.al., 2001; 
Hedborg, 2002) as a form of decentralised cooperation proceeding via 
municipalities, administrative boards, etc. Generally, the organisational support 
contained the development of official programmes, institutional cooperation and 
involvement in the EU line (see: Hedborg, 1998; Riksdag, 1997 [SOU 1997:159]; 
Riksdag, 1998 [SOU 1998:86]; Government Offices of Sweden, 2000; Hedborg, 
2002). Lastly, the transfer of knowledge and expertise has emerged as an 
important component in each area of cooperation (see examples in: Hedborg, 
1998; Hedborg, 2002).  
The final paragraph gives a brief introduction of the position of Sida in the aid-
giving policy from the given temporal and spatial context.  In general, we are 
dealing with a wide range of actors of governance involved in the Swedish policy 
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of development assistance on the national level (cf. Hedborg, 1998; Hedborg, 
2002). Riksdag and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been responsible for 
programming and coordinating the aid-giving policy. Hedborg (1998:11; 2002: 29) 
acknowledges Sida as the ‘central administrative agency for Sweden’s bilateral 
development cooperation’ through which 40 per cent of bilateral assistance has 
been channelled. In addition, Sida is the executive and competent proponent of 
changes in the reform process. At the same time, it has been Sida that proposed 
the conclusions and expertise constituting the programmes of development 
cooperation proposed by the government agencies (for instance, cf. Government 
Offices of Sweden [Latvia: country strategy], 2002:1). 
Summarising this sub-section, it began by the introduction of the worldview as a 
reflection on the relevant changes in Swedish policy. It went on the discussion of 
sectors in which Swedish aid-giving policy has been implemented. The adjusting 
to the EU enlargement has been identified in the development cooperation 
revealed in principle beliefs and certain measures introduced to supplement 
them. In the next section I will move on further to give an example of Swedish 
bilateral assistance to Latvia.  
5.1.3. Giving an example: Sweden’s development cooperation with Latvia 
In this part of the analysis report, I turn to the concrete example of Swedish 
development cooperation in Latvia. I follow the same logic of giving this example 
as Roman and Sandgren (1998: 2) who first designed their report analysis to 
provide ‘a detailed description’ of Swedish development cooperation with CEE 
countries. Similarly to other CEE countries, some priority has been given to Latvia 
from Sweden in the development of the country strategy (Government Offices of 
Sweden [Latvia: country strategy], 2002). Similarly to other CEE countries, Latvia 
has undergone the rapid process of transition after regaining its independence in 
1991. By such means, it may be shown up that, similarly to other CEE countries, 
Latvia has been relevant for Sweden as a recipient side, which had the same 
interest in post-Cold War development and integration with the EU. 
As was indicated in the report on the migration issue, the change of legislation, 
standards and practices forms the process of Europeanization for Latvia, as 
Latvia’s priority to integrate into the EU has been the driving force for progress 
(Nordquist and Schmidt, 2002: 11). What has been expressed by the EC in 
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opinion to the Latvia’s status, serves as an indicator of progress made towards 
the alignment with the Union in a given time frame (Roman and Sandgren, 1998: 
7; Government Offices of Sweden [Latvia: country strategy], 2002: 2–3). In 
accordance with the EC opinion, the Riksdag has identified such problems in 
legal sector as naturalisation of non-citizens, market economy, rule of law, 
democracy, etc. The steps initiated on the way to EU has been important for 
Latvia, as the country needed to be recognised by the Union (Nordquist and 
Schmidt, 2002: 11) and receive the EU financing (Government Offices of Sweden 
[Latvia: country strategy], 2002: 14). 
Sweden has established the development cooperation with respect to the 
undergoing reform process aimed at integration into the EU. The account of the 
EU enlargement is relevant as the general obligation taken by the Swedish 
Government and Swedish agencies as what constitutes Latvia’s aspiration or top 
priority (e.g. Roman and Sandgren, 1998: 44; Government Offices of Sweden 
[Yearbook], 2000: 182; Government Offices of Sweden [Latvia: country strategy], 
2002: 2–3; Hedborg, 2002: 22). Initiating cooperation with Latvia, the Swedish 
parliament set out the following goals of aid-giving policy (e.g. Roman and 
Sandgren 1998: 3):  
- to promote common security; 
- to deepen the culture of democracy; 
- to support socially sustainable economic transition; 
- to support environmentally sustainable development. 
Despite the main objectives of Swedish foreign aid policy seems to be general, 
they have gained the more stable form with the account of the EU enlargement. 
In other words, each of the development cooperation objectives has received the 
attention, in accordance with the main purpose of supporting the reform process 
towards the EU membership. 
In the area of security, the western orientation of Latvia with membership of the 
EU and NATO, has confirmed the possibility in enhancing cooperation towards 
common security in Europe, to which Sweden intended to contribute (Roman and 
Sandgren, 1998: 4). At the same time, Sida promoted the non-military aspects of 
security associated with the border control, combating of crime, migration and 
asylum policy etc. (Roman and Sandgren, 1998: 4; 8; Government Offices of 
Sweden [Latvia: country strategy], 2002: 9). In relation of the non-military 
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cooperation, Sida provided financial support to the dismantling of the Soviet 
military equipment with repatriation of the Soviet militants (Roman and Sandgren, 
1998: 8).  
Cooperation in the legal sector has been associating with qualification of the EU 
membership and increasing capacities of the state of Latvia to combat the illegal 
practices and provide the gender equality (Government Offices of Sweden 
[Latvia: country strategy], 2002: 12–13). Additionally, in the sector of justice and 
home affairs cooperation between police, migration and liaison offices, etc. has 
been elaborated to enable international police work closer to the EU integration 
aspect (Cameron, 2003: 19–26).  
The next subject of reporting is related to self-affirmation from the side of Sweden. 
The country has been affirmed as one of the largest donors to Latvia (e.g. Roman 
and Sandgren, 1998: 6; Government Offices of Sweden [Yearbook], 2000: 183; 
Hedborg, 2002: 22). The support through the projects has been relevant to the 
undergoing process of transition (Roman and Sandgren, 1998: 42), and such 
relevance has made Sweden an important economic partner and political 
coordinator in support of Latvia (cf. Nordquist and Schmidt, 2002: 11).  
The question of relative power is more multiple. On the one hand, the cooperation 
is about the increasing capacities implemented via money contribution, expertise 
or administration. On the other hand, Sweden seeks to make its power reduced 
or limited. The term ‘phase out’ used to describe the reduction of the involvement 
leading to normal relations (ad hoc) with its neighbours (in relation to Latvia, e.g. 
Roman and Sandgren, 1998: 1). At the same time, what increases the Swedish 
influence is the relatively small contribution from Latvia leading to the 
supplement-side management in projects (idem, 41).  
Giving the aspect of principled belief, I refer again to the question provided by 
Grabbe (ibid.) on what has been Europeanised. In other words, I discuss the 
measures of money, projects and administrative support introduced as tools of 
Europeanization of Latvia. One of them was money. In general, Sweden allocated 
in 1990–1997 SEK 560 million to projects in Latvia (Roman and Sandgren 1998: 
1), and the total amount in 1998–2000 was SEK 182 million (Hedborg, 2002: 22). 
Aid of the projects has been the second important instrument of cooperation for 
several reasons. First, they implemented the transfer of know-how or expertise 
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(Roman and Sandgren 1998; Government Offices of Sweden [Latvia: country 
strategy], 2002). Second, they initiated and developed the new forms of 
cooperation, such as twinning and administrative cooperation between 
institutions with different competencies at the regional and local level (ibid.).  
The final remark is on the question of what allows for arguing that Swedish foreign 
policy has been Europeanised? The first is the account of the Latvia’s aspiration 
for the EU membership, which has become the main objective of the Swedish 
country strategy on development cooperation. Second, the support of progress 
in many sectors has been as the support of modernization of the recipient side 
as a contribution to the values of security, justice, wealth, etc. relevant for the 
whole EU and the member states. Third, the transmission of support in the forms 
of money, expertise and organisational cooperation has been aimed at facilitation 
of the entry into the EU. Finally, through the overall process of programming and 
practicing of development assistance Sweden has built up the self-image of 
relevant actor. Such image has concorded with as the need of Latvia to integrate 
into the EU, whereas the Swedish policy was also contributing to the promotion 
of common values in Europe.   
5.2. Discussing the findings 
The research questions in the Master’s Thesis were about the nature and 
objectives of Swedish development assistance in the selected geographical area. 
With respect to this question, an initial objective of this research was to identify 
the linkage between the objectives of Swedish aid-giving policy and the EU 
enlargement. Partly, the answers have been given through the account of the 
previous studies in the literature review. This section is designed to comment on 
the findings resulting from the analytical work. I will also attempt to show how the 
findings relate to the previous observation of the literature.  
As the main processes of the post-Cold War development, transition of the Baltic 
states and the EU enlargement has received a considerable critical attention. The 
(re-) emergence of the Baltic question in a form of support and cooperation in the 
Nordic foreign policies has been stated in the study of Bergman (2006). In the 
analytical part of the work, this statement has found its confirmation, as the 
significance of changes in the immediate neighbourhood has been indicated in 
the relevant official reports of the Swedish institutions (e.g. Hedborg, 1998; 
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Hedborg, 2002; Sida, 1997; Government Offices of Sweden [Government Bill 
2002/03:122], 2004). Another significant and the most obvious finding is that the 
support on the transition of the Baltic states with facilitation of their integration 
with the EU as the principle objective of Swedish aid-giving policy. This finding is 
in agreement with the studies (e.g. Ozolina, 1999, Czarny, 2018) indicating that 
the EU membership has been essential for Swedish–Baltic cooperation.  
In addition to the previous point, such evaluation has received a considerable 
attention in the developed programmes of development assistance. The very 
support of Baltic integration into the EU has taken form of obligation from the 
Swedish supplement side.in the policy of development assistance. The 
continuing support of the reforms and adaptation for facilitation of the Baltic’s EU 
membership has already been mentioned with reference to Isaksson (2004). The 
EU has been previously characterised as an indicator of problems of countries in 
transition. This applying meaning of the role of EU in relation to the support of the 
reform process in the Baltic states allows for the account of areas of development 
cooperation (cf. Roman and Sandgren 1998; Government Offices of Sweden 
[Latvia: country strategy], 2002).   
The subject of cooperation areas has provided some new insights in the previous 
knowledge as well. For example, the vision of the ‘new’ Europe in the reorienting 
Swedish foreign policy (cf. Brommesson, 2010) has received the concrete 
understanding in the area of security-enhancing cooperation with the Baltic 
states. Common security has been indicated as one of the internationalist values 
in the work of Bergman (2006: 73), and this point may be confirmed in accordance 
with some of the data sources (e.g. Hedborg, 2002). It has been previously 
indicated that security has received the new understanding of being ‘non-military’ 
via the cooperation for safer borders or stable migration (ibid.).  
The commitment to the common values constitutes the Nordic image of 
‘internationalists’ (Bergman, 2006) or ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (Ingebritsen, 2002). 
In regard to this, if the area of secure Europe is taken as those of removed 
confrontational barriers, it implies the further promotion of peace, democracy, 
economic growth, sustainability, justice, social security, etc. (cf. Hedborg, 1998; 
Riksdagen [SOU 1997: 159], 1997; Hedborg, 2002). In the same vein, In the 
practice of development cooperation, the nominations of values have turned into 
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the nominations for areas of cooperation, as may be seen from the data sources 
(e.g. Sida, 1997 – on the area of justice and home affairs). This leads to the 
conclusion that as the values as the areas of cooperation have been interplaying 
in the programme and practice of foreign aid-giving policy. Such conclusion may 
serve as an explanation of why there is a methodological challenge in coding and 
categorising the textual material from data sources.  
The practice of development assistance also includes the shaping of stable forms 
of cooperation. The first is the programming of development cooperation in 
documents. The second is the transfer of money and expertise to the areas of 
cooperation. It has been indicated above that all forms of aid-transferring have 
been aimed at contribution to the integration into the EU (e.g. Roman and 
Sandgren, 1998: 1). This has led to the argument that Swedish development 
assistance to the Baltic states has been Europeanised.  
The last finding is related to the building up of influence and self-affirmation in 
Swedish development assistance. Here I count more on the example of Latvia 
that I used to undertake the research. In the chapter on the literature review it has 
been pointed out that the conditions were favourable for Sweden to increase its 
soft power (Kuldkepp, 2016: 401). It has been also noted that Sweden is a ‘soft 
donor’, which less exports its model but more accounts the preferences of the 
recipient than its interests (Danielson and Wohlgemuth, 2005: 518). This note 
has been indicated, in accordance with Bennich–Björkman (2002b: 354), as 
relevant to Latvia. 
The empirical analysis of the case of cooperation with Latvia has provided with 
some new insights to confirm these ideas. Through the activism in the practical 
support of Latvia’s transition, Sweden has indirectly demonstrated its 
commitment to the common values of security, peace, justice, democracy in 
Europe. In relations with Latvia, the country has built up the image of the relevant 
donor playing a leading role in the provision of development assistance to Latvia 
(cf. Roman and Sandgren, 1998; Hedborg, 2002). The point that Sweden has 
mainly initiated and run the development cooperation with Latvia (cf. Roman and 
Sandgren, 1998: 1) may serve as a confirmation of the relative strength of 
Swedish influence. The Swedish activism, as of any Nordic country, may be 
described in term of realpolitik (cf. Bergman, 2006). Meanwhile, the provision of 
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the logic of realpolitik is limited in this case of study, as the sources indicate that 
Sweden has been seeking the reduction of its intervention by phasing out the 
relations to the state of ‘normal neighbourhood’ (e.g. Roman and Sandgren, 
1998; 1; Hedborg, 1998: 10; Hedborg, 2002: 8; Eduards, 2004: 20–21). 
In this paragraph, I refer to the IR scholars previously discussed in the theoretical 
chapter of the Master’s Thesis. As was noted above, each theory proposing the 
dominating interest in the state actor behaviour: security, wealth, power, self-
affirmation, etc. All the frames of interests have become the categories of analysis 
(cf. Veen, 2011). These frames may be interpreted as forms of rationalisation and 
/ or construction what states are doing in their policies. On the one side, both 
theoretical approaches provide the account of the environment in which the state-
led actor has to operate. On the other side, the present research seems to be 
operating more in terms of constructivism. The terms of ‘worldview’ and ‘beliefs’ 
explains here how Sweden has constructed the vision of changes occurred in the 
close vicinity and how it has built up the self-image in response to the changes. 
To summarise the main findings, I present the following table: 
Table 4. Summarising the main finding of the research 
Worldview Frames (Codes) Beliefs 
- The processes of 
transition and the EU 
enlargement as the 
significant changes 
occurred in the 
Swedish immediate 
neighbourhood;  
 
- EU as the indicator 
of problems of 
transition to meet 
integration with the 
Union 
Principled  
(expected behaviour) 
Causal  
(policy measures 
introduced to 
make a certain 
foreign policy 
course effective) 
Security  An area of cooperation 
with the promotion of 
values: prosperity, 
wealth, democracy, etc. 
 The frames of 
subcoding: 
- Transfer of know-
how; 
- Transfer of 
money; 
- Organisation 
a) Sectoral 
support via 
institutions with 
decentralisation of 
cooperation; 
b) the impact of 
the future EU 
membership.  
 
Power  - The main sources of 
influence:  
decentralised 
cooperation and 
commitment to the 
promotion of values. 
- The reduced 
realpolitik. A ‘phase 
out’ as a reduction of 
the donor influence 
in development 
cooperation which is 
expected to be 
replaced by the 
normal neighbourly 
relations. 
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Wealth 
(economic, trade 
importance) 
New economic ties and 
adherence to the EU 
acquis communataire. 
Enlightened self-
interest  
Related to the promotion 
of values via security 
enhancing cooperation 
(see: Security) 
Reputation / self-
affirmation  
A position of the relevant 
donor playing a reading 
role in the support. 
Obligation  The facilitation of the 
EU’s membership for the 
country in transition; 
support of the reform 
process. 
Humanitarianism 
/ well-being  
Mainly associated with 
area of justice and home 
affairs and related to the 
issues of gender equality 
and social stability 
(shared w. wealth – 
social stability interplays 
with it). 
What to account: 
- The maximized benefit: self-affirmation, the prospective of economic and political ties with the 
newly independent Baltic states. The main costs: transaction (transfer of the forms of support) 
and less autonomous state with the involvement in the Baltic matters; 
- The sense of commitment to the Europe via the promotion of common values in the enhancing 
cooperation.  
 
  
 
 
55 
 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the current study was to examine Sweden’s foreign policy of 
development assistance towards Latvia with the help of the concept of 
Europeanisation. With respect to the concept, it sought to determine the effect of 
the EU enlargement in 1990-2004 on the Swedish development cooperation with 
the Baltic states through giving the example of Latvia’s side of recipient. Several 
research questions was designed in relation to the purpose and developed in the 
main body of the Master’s Thesis. The first research question was about the 
nature of relationship between Sweden and Latvia, in which Latvia is one of the 
Baltic states undergoing the process of transition. The second research question 
sought to identify the objectives of Swedish development assistance to the Baltic 
states and particularly to Latvia. 
In discussion of the nature of post-Cold War relations between Sweden and the 
Baltic states, it was argued that the way the relations were developing 
encompasses the affection from the immediate European environment, and the 
domestic reflection on the changes occurred. The post-Cold War development in 
Europe has been interpreted in Swedish policy of development cooperation with 
the Baltic states as significant. Consequently, the welcoming attitude towards the 
Baltic transition and the EU enlargement contributed much to the development of 
Swedish activism towards the Baltics requiring the revision of the neutrality 
tradition. 
The favourable conditions of the environment initiated the subject of interests in 
Nordic and Baltic foreign policies. Belonging to the post-Cold War development 
of Europe was important for Sweden and Latvia with the risk to get left out of that. 
The latter is the primary reason of choice of these countries for the study. The 
account of the problems in transition also provided the explanation of the choice 
of Latvia. 
Sweden demonstrated its willingness to support the Baltic transition through the 
foreign aid policy. As was mentioned earlier, the traditional understanding of 
foreign aid has been based on socio-economic progress and poverty reduction. 
The examination of the subject through the IR theories allowed for the proposition 
of the range of aid-giving policy motives in some of the literature (Veen, 2011). 
Considering the factor of the EU enlargement, I highlighted the rationalist and 
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constructivist assumptions (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). They were 
central to the entire discussion of what kind of driving forces the EU enlargement 
established: the varieties of self-interest seeking from the integration or the sense 
of belonging to the area of the EU. 
The method of content analysis is particularly useful in working with textual data. 
It allows for the account of the all varieties of why the aid is given. The deductive 
approach is applicable for putting the previous theoretical and methodological 
developments in the new context studied in the research. In other words, from 
the theoretical discussion, the established motives have been turned into the 
frames of analysis, which I put in the given temporal and spatial context. 
Hence, the context of the current examination was the Swedish development 
cooperation with the Baltic states. As was mentioned in the chapter on 
Methodology, the policy outcomes are not obvious themselves. During the 
analysis the main challenge was to measure the objectives and categorise them 
properly to one frame or another as they interplayed in the sources. For instance, 
security may be interpreted as a certain area as a part of enlightened self-interest 
on the promotion of secure environment as a common good. Giving the example 
of power / influence evaluation, I also indicated the uncertainty while was seeking 
the presence of self-interest or the sense of commitment. Whereas Sweden was 
the relatively influential donor, it was seeking the reduction of its involvement in 
the development of cooperation.  
At the same time, the EU enlargement has been projected at the cooperation, 
partly solving the problem of uncertainty. The data sources from Sweden has 
shown that it has been a general objective of the development assistance. In the 
research, it has become a field of the concrete examination of the motives. In 
other words, the motives for Swedish aid-giving policy has taken shape in relation 
to the facilitation of the EU enlargement. 
The example of Latvia, while it shed the light on cooperation and allows for the 
account of how the EU enlargement affected the Swedish policy of development 
cooperation is not very specific. The lack of information specifically related to this 
country confirms the previous point. On the contrary, it is the source on Latvia 
(Sandgren and Roman, 1998) that provided the more detailed information on the 
Swedish development cooperation with CEE countries. It is important that the 
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source has also indicated the seeking of the reducing influence on the recipient 
from the Swedish side.  Lastly, it is hoped that initiation of this research topic 
provides the new insights with the further elaboration of the discussion.  
I suppose this discussion is useful mainly for the academic reasons. The concept 
of Europeanisation is central to the understanding of the EU influence on the 
national policies. In this thesis, I deliberately limited the presence of the EU to the 
state of the external factor to show up the indirect impact. Another significant 
subject is about power. The case of Swedish activism shows that it does not imply 
the intension to exercise the power more. Lastly, there is a small provision of sub-
state Swedish agencies in the activism. Associating their practical exercise with 
the overall number of motives in aid-giving policy, the researcher might lead to 
the broader discussion of who and how stay behind the increasing of state actor 
capacities. At the same time, even the account of sub-state actors may give 
another geometry of state leadership. 
This year, Latvia and the other Baltic states are celebrating the 15th anniversary 
of their integration into the EU. After so many years, the variety of models may 
be suggested to study and evaluate the concrete cases of the post-Soviet 
transition through the interaction of the newly independent states with the other 
state or sub-state players in cooperation. At the same time, the topic of Swedish 
activism in the support of the Baltic countries is worth further attention, also with 
regard to the much debated issue of the (post-)neutrality.  
A comparison of countries in transition via the development cooperation may 
bring up the question of success for both donor and recipient sides. Why some 
countries are more / less successful in their transition and in which areas? What 
benefits does the development cooperation bring to the sub-state players 
involved in the development cooperation? How to measure the effectiveness of 
cooperation for the relevant sides in a concrete case? As such, these questions 
do not receive much attention in the current research, they are still expecting 
further investigation. 
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